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Following the Nice compromise in 2000, the European Union adopted the legislation which 
constitutes the legal framework for the Societas Europaea (SE) on a European level. To this 
date, many gaps on the European level remain which are filled with national law, as is the 
main content of Article 9 SE-regulation. Article 9, however, is much more complex, leaving 
many questions open to discussion. The thesis undertakes it to assess the suitability of 
Article 9 and, thereby, if similar solutions in parallel processes of legislation are 
recommendable, in a two-step approach: in a first part, the problems of interpretation are 
discussed. This reveals a number of obscurities which have led to discussion in legal 
literature. Some of these problems can be reduced to national peculiarities, while others can 
be solved using traditional legal methods of interpretation. In a second step, the results of 
these discussions are used to assess – among other criteria – the suitability of Article 9. 
While some points could be formulated more clearly, the workability of the current 
legislation may be below the expectations, but is still given. The present form of the SE-
regulation can be seen as slightly improving the possibilities for regulatory competition, but 
in a manner where a „race to the bottom“ is not a threat. While more regulations on the 
European level remain desirable, the result of the Nice compromise constitutes a stepping 
stone towards this end. With the establishment of the SE, growing acceptance in the legal 
practice and attention in the literature are to be expected. Both will provide incentives for 
the legislator to develop further the current legislation. The solution of Article 9 therefore 
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I. The Nice compromise 
It may appear shocking or amusing that what was later do be dubbed “the flagship” 1 of 
European company law2 might not have come about without the involvement of Basque 
terrorists, but it is reported that only in exchange against a promise by Chirac to step up 
French cooperation in hunting down said terrorists, Spain gave up its resistance against any 
labour law in the statute of the Societas Europaea (SE) and made the “Nice compromice” 
possible3. As is commonly known, this resulted a short year later in the passing of the 
European legislation for the SE, consisting in the SE-regulation4 and a directive dealing with 
the worker participation issue5. This compromise set an end to a weary legislation process 
which had gone on for some 40 years, reaching back to the enthusiastic period of the 1960s6 
and 1970s when drafts of more than 400 articles were discussed. When passed in 2001, the 
SE-regulation had been narrowed down7 by the need to political compromise to 70 articles, 
in which up to 848 provisions referring to national law of the member states were counted, 
all centered around what can be called the “backbone” 9 of the law of the SE, Article 9: 
Article 9 
1. An SE shall be governed: 
(a) by this Regulation, 
(b) where expressly authorised by this Regulation, by the provisions of 
its statutes 
(c) in the case of matters not regulated by this Regulation or, where 
matters are partly regulated by it, of those aspects not covered by it, 
by: 
(i) the provisions of laws adopted by Member States in 
implementation of Community measures relating specifically to 
SEs; 
(ii) the provisions of Member States' laws which would apply to 
a public limited-liability company formed in accordance with 
                                                     
1 Hopt, “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht - Krise und neue Anläufe,” 99. 
2 In this thesis, the term „European company law“ will be with lower-case „company“ and „law“ if referring to 
the company law of the European Union, including the Council Directives, and with upper-case “Company Law” 
if referring to the law of the European Company (Societas Europaea). 
3 Hopt, “The European Company (SE) under the Nice Compromise: Major Breakthrough or Small Coin for 
Europe?,” 467 f. 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE). 
5 Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with 
regard to the involvement of employees. 
6 Two prior drafts stem from 1970 and 1975. As the hour of birth is commonly quoted Sanders, “Auf dem Weg 
zu einer europäischen Aktiengesellschaft?” 
7 Cf. to the development of the SE and the parallel development of company law harmonization Schürnbrand, 
“Vollharmonisierung im Privatrecht.” 
8 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 547; Storm, Paul M., 
“The Societas Europaea: A New Opportunity?,” 14 counts “65 references to national law and 32 options for 
Member States.” 






the law of the Member State in which the SE has its registered 
office; 
(iii) the provisions of its statutes, in the same way as for a public 
limited-liability company formed in accordance with the law of 
the Member State in which the SE has its registered office. 
[…] 
This complex “eldorado of methodology” 10 has to be read in context with the rest of the SE-
regulation which mainly regulates formation and structure of the SE, leaving even there 
many details to national law. This has led to the disappointed verdict that now there exist 15 
types of SE (one for each member state – today there would be 28) rather than one truly 
supranational legal form11. 
But however desirable a true supranational company may have been, the terrorist anecdote 
casts light on this showpiece example of difficulties in European politics, so that the Nice 
compromise was probably the best solution that could be reached. 
Or was it? Given that the European legislator is currently discussing parallel projects12, the 
question rises whether one should advise the legislator in a similar situation not to pass any 
legislation at all to prevent the abovementioned disappointment. No legislation may be 
better than an unsatisfactory legislation. 
II. Question and Outline 
In this thesis, I will try to answer the question if the Nice compromise led to such 
unsatisfactory legislation in the shape of the cited Article 9, or if instead the current SE-
regulation constitutes a true step forward: it appears possible that the compromise on the 
one hand becomes “fossilized” and hard to ever overturn, but on the other that is paves the 
way for greater acceptance of the SE which in the future may then well be further 
harmonized. If the legislator comes to a similar point in the political process like in December 
2000 in Nice, is the model of the current Article 9 a feasible way to overcome lack of 
agreement on substantive law? What could be made better? Or should the legislator refrain 
from legislation altogether? 
My approach to answer this question will be split in two parts. In the first part of the thesis 
(B), I will dwell in the “eldorado” of Article 9 to assess how many problems of interpretation 
it poses and how they can be solved. Results I hope to draw from this discussion will help in 
                                                     
10 Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 72; similarly (“lawyer’s paradise”) already Sanders, “Structure and Progress of the 
European Company,” 89. 
11 E.g. Hopt, “Europäische Aktiengesellschaft - per aspera ad astra?,” 1; Lutter, “Europäische Aktiengesellschaft 
- Rechtsfigur mit Zukunft?,” 1.; Menjucq, “La société européenne, Règlement CE n° 2157/2001 et directive 
2001/86/CE du Conseil du 8 octobre 2001”, under I.B.1.; along the same lines Colangelo, “La ‘Società Europea’ 
alla prova del mercato comunitario delle regole,” 172, footnote 62.; underlining more the core communities 
between the different SEs Rescio, “La Società Europea Tra Diritto Comunitario E Diritto Nazionale,” 977 
(footnote 25). 
12 Cf. e.g. the similar wording of the parallel Art. 8 SCE-regulation (draft). See to other projects in general 





the second part (C), alongside other criteria, to evaluate the advisability of Article 9 (or 











B. First Part. Interpretation of Article 9 SE-regulation 
The first part which will deal with the interpretation of Article 9 will be divided into three 
parts – after a short introduction into the methodology (I, p. 17) I will use in the following 
examinations I will look at questions regarding the cases in which Article 9 is applicable (II, p. 
21) and, thirdly, what it says in these cases, ie the content (III, p. 40). By doing so, I will 
follow the thinking process of any lawyer who is concerned with a case and has first to ask 
him- or herself whether Article 9 is applicable in the case at hand and (only) if so, what it 
says. 
By choosing this structure, I have found myself confronted with the problem that many 
factual problems are discussed in the literature at different parts of this structure, i.e. 
different approaches to one problem – e.g. the concern that the applicable law of groups 
should be the one for the controlled company, not the controlling company13 – are solved on 
different levels. This holds true for the mentioned exemplary problem. Some14 see it as a 
problem of the ambit on the level of substantive law (then below B II 2 d, p. 32), others15 as a 
problem of the content of Article 9 (comprehensive referral) (then below B III 4, p. 49). 
Because it makes sense to discuss all approaches together, and because the place I believe is 
the right one to discuss the problems does not always come first, I had at some points refer 
to answers I would give later or give a short justification and repeat it again later (cf. for the 
exemplary problem B II 1 at the end). I still decided to stick to this structure since I believe it 
to clarify already some of the issues that may exist with Article 9. 
I. Methodology 
First, an overview over the methods used in interpreting European Law shall be provided, 
paying special attention to the peculiarities of the SE-Regulation. Starting point is that the 
European Law constitutes a legal order of its own right16, independent of the Member States’ 
legal orders, with which comes an autonomous understanding of the European 
terminology17. Nevertheless, the ECJ too, rests on the traditional methods (or “elements”, as 
von Savigny called them) of interpretation, namely literal, teleological, systematic and 
historical interpretation. The following overview will therefore be structured along these 
lines, paying at each step special attention to the peculiarities of European Law (which affect 
all elements of interpretation18), the SE-Regulation in general and Art. 9 SE-Regulation in 
special. 
                                                     
13 This is a unanimous concern, cf. p. 20 ff. 
14 E.g. Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung.”  
15 E.g. Habersack, “Das Konzernrecht Der Deutschen SE - Grundlagen.”  
16  Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des 
Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 402; Grundmann and Riesenhuber, “Die Auslegung 
Des Europäischen Privat- Und Schuldvertragsrechts,” 529. 
17 Cf. ECJ of 06.10.1982, case 283/81, CILFIT, [1982] ECR 3415 (recital 19): “Community law uses terminology 
which is peculiar to it”. 






The starting point for interpretation of European Law is the wording. In nearly all cases, the 
ECJ starts out with quoting the provisions in argument19. The wording is binding in all 24 
official languages, not just in the language of the case or in the language of the member 
state20. This means that in applying the law, all language versions have to be taken into 
account. If they divert, a simple resort to alleged translation mistakes is not possible; 
differences have to be bridged with the help of the other interpretation methods. This adds 
another difficulty and possible source of divergent outcomes to the interpretation of 
European law. 
Especially in the SE-Regulation, divergences of language versions would be detrimental. 
While in many other fields of European Private Law, differences between language versions 
may not crop up in everyday cases, the SE-Regulations provides for cases which necessarily 
have a bearing on at least two different legal orders21. For companies who seek to do 
business on an at least European level, spanning borders and maybe aiming at cross-border 
transfer of seat or merger, legal uncertainty caused by possible different interpretation of 
law in different member states is deterrent22. 
Article 9 SE-Regulation is situated at a crucial fulcrum since the question which law has to be 
applied has to be taken into account as a first step in every question regarding the SE. This 
makes every language diversion more delicate and may help to explain why there was 
confusion especially over (the absence of) one word in the provision, a problem which I will 
discuss later when assessing the content of Article 9 (B III 3, p. 48). 
2. Teleology 
The teleological interpretation is usually regarded as the most important and distinct 
interpretation method of European Law23. This holds true especially for the European 
company law where the ECJ makes use of this method in all cases it has to decide24. 
In European Private Law, the interpreter will resort to the Recitals and the legal basis for the 
norm25. In the second degree, the formal regulation goals of every private law convergence 
come into play, namely the unification of law and the establishment of the internal market26. 
                                                     
19 Ibid. 
20 Cf. Article 1 of Council Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 determining the languages to be used by the 
European Economic Community, amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 517/2013 (dealing with the accession 
of the Republic of Croatia). 
21 Cf. Article 2 of the SE-Regulation for the different scenarios. 
22 See, to that effect, “Ernst & Young, Study on the Operation and the Impacts of the Statute for a European 
Company (SE), - 2008/S 144-192482, Final Report, 9 December 2009,” 241. 
23 Grundmann and Riesenhuber, “Die Auslegung Des Europäischen Privat- Und Schuldvertragsrechts,” 531; 
Lutter, “Die Auslegung angeglichenen Rechts,” 602 f. 
24 Hommelhoff, “Die Auslegung angeglichenen Gesellschaftsrechts, Eine Analyse der EuGH-Rechtsprechung,” 37. 
25 Grundmann and Riesenhuber, “Die Auslegung Des Europäischen Privat- Und Schuldvertragsrechts,” 531; 
Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des Europäischen 
Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 405. 





The principle of effet utile is decisive as well. For the SE-regulation, the goal of creating a 
supranational legal form is vital. This is also27 reflected in Recital 6 of the SE-Regulation 
which underlines the importance of the coincidence of economic and legal unit of business 
in the Community, therefore aiming at the creation of companies “formed and carrying on 
business under the law created by a Community Regulation directly applicable in all Member 
States”. Any interpretation, and especially that of Article 9, therefore has to aim at the 
functioning of the supranational legal form28. 
3. System 
It is widely accepted that the legal order of the European Union constitutes a more and more 
systematic entity which allows for systematic interpretation. Being one of the classical four 
methods of interpretation, the importance of the systematic interpretation in European law 
may not be as big as the one of the teleological interpretation (from which is it not always 
clearly distinguished29), but is still paramount30. 
From a systematic point of view, it is imaginable to interpret secondary legislation either by 
establishing a system within one legal act (here, the SE-regulation) or by drawing on other 
legal acts, both of primary or other secondary law. 
The importance of interpretation in conformity with primary law is widely acknowledged31. 
As concerns the interpretation of European company law, the right of establishment (and 
the principle of free movement of capital) as laid down in articles 49 (and 63) TFEU are 
considered to be of main importance32. 
I will come back to questions of systematic interpretation when discussing the content of Art. 
9, especially the question to what extent principles should be used in interpreting Article 9 (B 
III 2, p. 44). 
4. History 
The historical interpretation does not play a major role in European law33. This may be due 
to the shorter historical background of European law, but also reflects the lower grade of 
availability of legal documents and drafts on the European level as opposed to national 
legislation34. In European company law, the ECJ usually does not give effect to the role of the 
                                                     
27 Cf. also Recital 10: “the essential objective of legal rules governing SEs is […] it must be possible at least to 
create such a company”. 
28  Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des 
Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 406; Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz Art. 9 SE-VO, Recital 17. 
29 Casper, in: Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz Art. 9 SE-VO recital 16. 
30  Grundmann, “‘Inter-Instrumental-Interpretation’, Systembildung durch Auslegung im Europäischen 
Unionsrecht,” 884 ff. 
31 Ibid., 895 f. 
32 Schön, “Das Bild Des Gesellschafters Im Europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht,” 2. 
33 Lutter, “Die Auslegung angeglichenen Rechts,” 599; less strong Grundmann and Riesenhuber, “Die Auslegung 
Des Europäischen Privat- Und Schuldvertragsrechts,” 530. 
34 Grundmann and Riesenhuber, “Die Auslegung Des Europäischen Privat- Und Schuldvertragsrechts,” 530; 
Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des Europäischen 





history in its judgments35, even though there are cases when the Advocate General 
predicated its opinion on previous drafts of the provision at issue36. The reasoning behind 
the emergence of the provision, though, can be of importance, referring to the legal 
situation in the member states at the point of time when the provision was adopted37. This 
may, on the other hand, not result in the simple adoption of member state interpretation; as 
can be seen from the example of the Tomberger case38, where the “true and fair view” was, 
regardless of its British derivation, interpreted by the ECJ independently from this origin39. 
The SE-regulation may to a certain degree constitute an exception to this rule40, given the 
abundant drafts and opinions which have accrued over decades. In every single case, though, 
it is necessary to ascertain to which degree it is helpful to draw on previous drafts. Historical 
interpretation cannot mean to bring to bear the content of drafts which were purposefully 
not adopted in the end41.  In some cases, rather an argumentation e contrario may be 
appropriate. A changed wording may be interpreted as a hint towards a change in the 
intention of the legislator42. The role of historical interpretation may be flawed by the fact 
that most provisions bear the character of political compromise43. 
As to Article 9, the previous drafts have been published44 and discussed45 in abundance. The 
drastic changes that it underwent on the one hand reflect the process of political 
negotiation: in parallel with the shrinking of the SE-Regulation, Article 9 had to refer to 
member state law for more and more purposes. On the other hand, even the first draft 
reflects the need for a “vertical norm of conflict” between different layers of regulation so 
                                                     
35 Hommelhoff, “Die Auslegung angeglichenen Gesellschaftsrechts, Eine Analyse der EuGH-Rechtsprechung,” 33. 
36 Ibid., refers to ECJ of 12.11.1974, case 32/74, Haaga, [1974] ECR I-1201, opinion of the Advocate General 
Mayras on page I-1209. 
37 Ibid., 33 f. gives the example of ECJ of 19.11.1996, case 42/95, Siemens/Nold, [1996] ECR I-6017 where the 
argument that to most member states, a pre-emptive right of shareholders in case of capital increase through a 
contribution in kind was not known was used to argue that this question was left to the member states. 
38 ECJ  of 27.06.1996, case 234/94, Tomberger, [1996] ECR I-3133. 
39 Grundmann and Riesenhuber, “Die Auslegung Des Europäischen Privat- Und Schuldvertragsrechts,” 530; 
Luttermann, “Juristische Übersetzung als Rechtspolitik im Europa der Sprachen, Eine wirtschaftsrechtlich-
linguistische Betrachtung.” 
40  Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des 
Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 404; Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz SE-VO Art. 9, Recital 17. 
41 In this direction, though, goes Oechsler, in: Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz Art. 5 SE-VO Recital 3 (referring to the notion of shares). 
42 Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 56. 
43 Sceptical also Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung 
Des Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 404; Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar 
zum Aktiengesetz SE-VO Art. 9 Recital 17. 
44 Published and politically discussed were the drafts of 1970 (COM(70) 600), 1989 (COM(89)268 final – SYN 
218) and 1991 (COM(91)174 final – SYN 218), cf. annex. The draft of 1975 (COM(75) 150 final) was never 
subject of a (serious) political discussion, Grundmann, European Company Law § 33 Recital 2. 
45  Lindacher, “Maßgebendes Recht, Auslegung und Lückenschließung”; Schwarz, Europäisches 
Gesellschaftsrecht; Grote, Das neue Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft zwischen europäischem und 
nationalem Recht; Raiser, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft und die nationalen Aktiengesetze”; Kreuzer, “Die 





that the comparison with previous versions might help shed light on the interpretation of 
Article 9. 
5. Legal comparison 
Legal comparison is not mentioned by von Savigny and does not constitute a traditional 
method of interpretation in national methodology. In European methodology, however, the 
importance of legal comparison, even though not always visible e.g. in the judgments of the 
ECJ, is often underlined, maybe not as a distinct “element” of interpretation, but as a 
consideration to take into account in the course of the other methods of interpretation46. 
While this would mean for the SE as a whole to draw on comparisons with the member 
states’ public limited companies, for Article 9 in special, there seems to be hardly any 
comparison since this vertical norm of conflict would be unparalleled in the law of a single 
member state with only one layer of legislation47. 
6. Economic Analysis of Law 
Economic analysis of law is no traditional method of interpretation, but that does not mean 
that it cannot be a means of interpretation especially in the European context which is 
methodologically independent from national legal orders. In the realm of European private 
law, the admissibility of economic analysis of law is promoted by the fact that most rules 
have as background the idea to further the internal market of the European Union. In the 
case of the SE-regulation, the Recitals (esp. 1, 4, and 10) refer to such an idea such as does 
the empowering provision of Art. 308 EC Treaty 48 . The dispute whether economic 
considerations can only be made if the legislator had such a concept in mind at least to a 
certain degree49 seems therefore to be not relevant in the case of the SE-regulation. 
For the questions in this paper, the economic analysis seem so far to be of lesser importance, 
given the rather concrete questions of adjective nature. Where economic considerations 
were in place, they could mostly be discussed under the heading “teleology”. Economic 
analysis of law will, though, constitute an important tool to assess the “suitability” of Art. 9 
in the second part of the master thesis. 
7. Preliminary result 
In the course of the following assessment, I will mainly follow the classical methods of 
interpretation, but whereever helpful also draw on the methods mentioned under (5.) and 
(6.). 
II. Applicability 
In the following part, I will assess in which cases Article 9 is applicable. By the subsections of 
this chapter, I again follow the order in which a lawyer would check the applicability. Article 
                                                     
46 Henninger, Europäisches Privatrecht und Methode, 293 ff.; Brandt, Hauptversammlung, 18 f., 23; Colneric, 
“Auslegung Des Gemeinschaftsrechts Und Gemeinschaftsrechtskonforme Auslegung,” 28 f. 
47 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 551. 
48 To the background of the empowering provision and the dispute between the Parliament and the Council cf. 
Neye, “Kein neuer Stolperstein für die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft.” 
49 Cf. Grundmann and Riesenhuber, “Die Auslegung Des Europäischen Privat- Und Schuldvertragsrechts,” 532 f. 





9 poses first questions of private international law, which I will deal with first (under 1), and 
secondly, given that the applicability is affirmed from a private international law point of 
view, questions of an “ambit of regulation” which is discussed in legal literature, will be 
discussed (under 2). 
1. Level of private international law: application of private international law before 
applying Article 9? 
Private international lawyers tell us that the first question which one always has to ask is 
whether or not to apply private international law in a case – regardless of the question if the 
case is an international one50. This question must be distinguished from the question 
whether Article 9 refers to substantive law with or without the law of conflicts of the 
respective member state (cf. below B III 4, p. 49). In both cases, questions of private 
international law are raised, but one belongs to the applicability of Article 9, the other one is 
a question of its content, its applicability already provided. 
If any legal dispute concerning the SE is brought before a national court in Europe51, the 
priority of European law over national law includes also the rules of private international law. 
Where there is no European private international law – like is the case for the areas covered 
by the SE-regulation, where especially the Rome-I and Rome-II regulations do not apply – the 
result is always that harmonized substantive law is applicable within its ambit without 
respect to national provisions on the conflict of laws52. This can be construed as harmonized 
substantive law overruling private international law53. Another possibility to construe this is 
that the rules which determine the ambit of the harmonized substantive law (on the level of 
substantive law) are seen also as special provisions on the law of conflicts54. Since both 
approaches reach the same abovementioned conclusion, I will here not decide this 
argument which in its doctrinal nature seems to be a rather German discussion55. Since the 
second approach, however, is more tangible, I want to point to the possibility of construing 
Article 9 – which, as we will see later (cf. below 2), determines the regulatory ambit – 
determines also the ambit of applicability on the level of private international law along the 
same lines56. I will dwell on the delimitation of this ambit in more detail below (in B II 2 c, p. 
28). 
For the level of private international law it suffice to mention that the ambit is the principally 
the same, but limited for some areas which are explicitly exempt in the Recitals. This is the 
case for the law of groups, where Recital 16 declares that the “rules and general principles of 
                                                     
50 Kegel and Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht, 6 f. (§ 1 III); Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, 7 (§ 1 IV). 
51 See for details on the situation before courts outside Europe: Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und 
sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 452 f. 
52 E.g. Caemmerer, “Rechtsvereinheitlichung und internationales Privatrecht,” 74. 
53  Early already Zweigert and Drobnig, “Einheitliches Kaufgesetz und internationales Privatrecht,” 148; 
Sonnenberger, in: Sonnenberger, MünchKommBGB Volume 11 5th ed. Einl. IPR Recital 125; with further 
references (footnote 63) Fornasier, “»28.« versus »2. Regime« – Kollisionsrechtliche Aspekte Eines Optionalen 
Europäischen Vertragsrechts,” 417. 
54 Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht § 12 I a and § 13 I. 
55 Sonnenberger, in: Sonnenberger, MünchKommBGB Volume 11 5th ed. Ein. IPR Recital 124. 
56 E.g. Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der 





private international law should therefore be applied both where an SE exercises control and 
where it is the controlled company”. For reasons of clarity I will deal with the applicable law 
on groups in one section below (in B II 2 d, p. 32), where I will give more reasoning for the 
result which I for reasons of structure had to be mentioned here already. 
2. Level of substantive law: “ambit of regulation” of Article 9? 
The next question is whether article 9 is applicable as opposed to other substantive law of 
the same legal order, i.e. national law of the respective member state. The question is 
mostly formulated asking for a “regulatory ambit” of Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) (and sometimes 
further limited to (ii)) – because all the contentious cases fall under lit. (c). The reason for 
this is that  the cases of lit. (a) and (b) are limited by the regulation itself and therefore 
clearer; the reference in lit. (c), however, is so wide that doubts arise whether there should 
not be a further restraint – the “regulatory ambit”. I will formulate the question wide, as 
stated above, but confess that most argumentation is taken from the narrow case of 
restricting Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) (ii). 
a. Is the idea of such an ambit a useful idea? 
If the question is asked in a narrow sense, asking for the ambit of Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) – i.e. 
the content of the requirements laid down before the first (i) – one has first to distinguish 
between two alternatives. In the English version, these are firstly, “the case of matters not 
regulated by this Regulation”, and, secondly, “where matters are partly regulated by it, […] 
those aspects not covered by it”. Both alternatives pose a number of questions – the second 
one especially when it comes to its application in detail (e.g. law of groups or takeover law, 
cf. below B II 2 e, p. 40)57. 
(i) Wording 
The wording – “in the case of matters not regulated by this regulation“ – appears clear at 
first glance. It can be interpreted as meaning all possible matters that an SE could encounter 
in its legal life. The provision is often rendered in this way, while it often remains unclear if 
this is just a mere repetition of the words of Article 9 para 1 lit. (c) or if this is supposed to 
assert the apparent content of the provision58. In fact, this is the case in most literature 
where Article 9 is mentioned. But there are still some cases where the question is raised 
whether the ambit of Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) should not be read in a more restrictive way59. 
                                                     
57  Cf. for more problematic areas Kuhn, in: Jannott and Frodermann, Handbuch der Europäischen 
Aktiengesellschaft Chapter 2 Recital 26; Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs 
Der SE-Verordnung,” 385 f. 
58 This is true for nearly all literature which is not from Germany and for most of the German literature, too. For 
the German literature, cf. only (also otherwise very attentive to details) Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der 
Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen 
Gesetzgeber,” 395 ff.; and (in more detail, but nevertheless without any mentioning this problem) Teichmann, 
“European Company-A Challenge to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners, The,” 326 ff. From the literature 
from abroad: cf. Colombani and Favero, Societas Europaea, 52 (Recital 176); da Costa and Bilreiro, The 
European Company Statute, 14; van Gerven, “Provisions of Community Law Applicable to the Societas 
Europaea,” 75; Beguin, “Le rattachement de la société européenne,” 40. 
59  Most explicitly the German legal literature, especially Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische 





This, again, is a question which is most explicitly and in the most detailed way discussed in 
German Legal literature, but there are also contributions from other countries, especially in 
Italy60. 
The question is in Germany often linked to the catchphrase of “regulatory ambit” 
(“Regelungsbereich”), a term which I will avoid in the following discussion, since I believe 
that the term further obfuscates the already complex discussion61. The problem is whether 
Article 9 para 1 lit. (c) should, notwithstanding the wide wording, be applied only in a limited 
number of cases (there will then, in a next step, be discussion about the delimitation of 
cases, cf. below B II 2 c, p. 28), while the rest of the cases should not be determined by 
Article 9. The applicable law for these cases would, as normally, be determined by the 
application of private international law and the respective substantive law to which private 
international law refers. 
(ii) History 
In my understanding, a closer review of the provision shows that this is indeed the case. A 
historical view at the previous versions of the text shows that at least in the draft of 1989, 
the contrasting juxtaposition of “matters covered by this Regulation” (Art. 7 para. 1 Draft 
(1989)) and “matters which are not covered by this Regulation”62 (Art. 7 para. 3 Draft (1989)) 
was to be read as opposing two different areas, only one of them being covered by the 
regulation. For the other, the provision referred to “Community law and the law of the 
Member States”63. This juxtaposition could have been taken over by the final version of 2001, 
where indeed some versions repeat a similar or identical wording as that of 1989 in what is 
now Art. 9 para. 1 lit. (c)64. This argumentation would support the view that Article 9 para. 1 
lit. (c) should be applied to all cases regarding the SE which are not covered by the regulation, 
now referring only to law of the Member States (which could be seen as a consequence of 
the lesser regulatory density of the finally adopted SE-Regulation). On the other hand, other 
language versions, most prominent the English and French version, differ largely and make 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung”; Wagner, “Die Bestimmung Des Auf Die SE Anwendbaren Rechts”; 
previously with regard to the European Economic Interest Grouping Wagner, Der Europäische Verein. 
60 Rescio, “La Società Europea Tra Diritto Comunitario E Diritto Nazionale,” 989; Colangelo, “La ‘Società Europea’ 
alla prova del mercato comunitario delle regole,” 167, more clearly on p. 168. 
61 The term is used differently by Wagner, “Die Bestimmung Des Auf Die SE Anwendbaren Rechts,” 988., on the 
one hand, who applies it only to the second alternative of Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c), and on the other hand Brandt 
and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 548; following them Lächler 
and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 382., who apply the term to 
both alternatives of Article 9 para 1 lit. (c) but are not attentive to the different conceptions (cf. the wrong 
quotation of Wagner in Ibid., 382 (footnote 14). This may be the reason why both sides believe to disagree with 
each other (cf. below). 
62 In other languages: German: die „von dieser Verordnung nicht geregelten Bereiche“; French: „les matières 
qui ne sont pas régies par le présent règlement”; Italian: “le materie non disciplinate dal presente 
regolamento” ; Spanish : “las materias no reguladas por el presente Reglamento”. 
63 Grote, Das neue Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft zwischen europäischem und nationalem Recht, 
90 ff.; Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 548. 






the similarities in other language versions look rather accidental65. Furthermore, the relation 
between the drafts of 1989 and 2001 is interrupted by the draft of 1991, which does not 
reflect any similarity in the wording. If the new draft had really been supposed to reenact 
the 1989 juxtaposition, a clearer reference would have been likely. The historic comparison, 
therefore, is at least not cogent in pointing to a wide application of Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c). 
(iii) Systematic interpretation 
Most fruitful seems to be the systematic point of view. One can cite Recital 20 which 
provides that this “Regulation does not cover other areas of law such as taxation, 
competition, intellectual property or insolvency. The provisions of the Member States’ law 
and of Community law are therefore applicable in the above areas and in other areas not 
covered by this Regulation”. Since “this Regulation” includes also Article 9, it would indeed 
be strange if Article 9 could determine the applicability of law in an area where Article 9 
itself is not applicable66. Article 9 can therefore not be applicable to the areas enunciated by 
Recital 20, but since this provision is commonly understood as an open-ended list, this may 
not be the only limitation to the ambit of Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c). 
Indeed it leads to further problems if Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) is understood as regulating all 
matters of the SE. First, such a wide use application of Article 9 would run counter to the 
principle of subsidiarity to which the European legislator is bound67. Furthermore, Article 9 
para. 1 lit. (c) (ii) can only be either a comprehensive referral – referring to a member state 
including its private international law – or a transmission provision, referring to substantive 
law of the member state where the company has its seat, regardless of what this state’s 
private international law would say. However this question is decided – being a matter of the 
content of Art. 9, I will deal with it later, cf. B III 4, p. 49 – it leads to problems if the ambit of 
Article 9 is supposed to be unlimited. 
To consider Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) (ii) as comprehensive referral would run counter to 
Recital 9, stating that “the approximation of national company law has made substantial 
progress”, which only refers to the substantive law, not the law of conflicts68. Thus, it would 
only make sense for Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) to refer to the substantive law, which is also in 
line with other literature on the conflict of laws69. The resorting to private international law 
would also add another source of insecurity, which might lead to the application of the 
                                                     
65 “les matières non réglées par le présent règlement”, “matters not regulated by this Regulation”. Brandt and 
Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 548 point to the differences in the 
English version. 
66 Ibid.; Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 383; Jaecks 
and Schönborn, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, das Internationale und das deutsche Konzernrecht,” 255. 
67 Lächler, Das Konzernrecht der Europäischen Gesellschaft, 84. 
68 Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 384. To the 
differing concepts on the connecting factor in company law in Europe cf. Grundmann, European Company Law 
§ 7 Recitals 4 - 10. 






provisions of different member states, depending on which member state court would try 
the case70. 
Of course, in the matter of company law, this would not hold true since Article 7 provides 
that the siège statutaire and the headquarters have to be in the same place. This means that 
the two main theories in international company law in Europe would come to the same 
result. This is also mentioned in the literature71 but can be countered with the argument that 
the European legislator might want to change the provision again to give more freedom to 
the companies, especially given the recent ECJ judicature moving towards the admissibility 
of differing siège statutaire and headquarters72. In the case of the SE, this would take away a 
lot of the clarity that Article 9 provides for easy cases. The “insertion of yet another floor 
into the already delicate building of Article 9” would severely damage the practical use of 
the SE-regulation73. 
The other possibility is to read Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) (ii) as a transmission provision. Since it 
would refer to all cases and since the private international law of the member states does 
not play a role for the applicability on the level of private international law (cf. above B II 1, p. 
22), this would result in the fact that private international law would not play a role for any 
question regarding the SE. Already on the face of it, this alternative would run counter to the 
intention of the legislator, as laid down e.g. in Recitals 15 and 16, to respect the private 
international law. But it would also furthermore lead to intolerable results in cases which are 
only loosely connected to the fact that one participant in a legal quarrel is an SE. If e.g. all 
property which belongs to the SE, even real estate in another country than the seat of the SE, 
is regulated by the law to which Article 9 refers – i.e. the law of the seat – this would run 
counter to one of the (few) (nearly) unanimously accepted principles of private international 
law74 and create intolerable confusion and legal uncertainty. Still, the aim of having a 
completely harmonized law of the SE could not be achieved, since the European law would 
not have the power to determine the applicable law of third countries. Every court within 
Europe75 (both national and European) would then apply to the property of an Italian-seated 
SE in real estate situated in Switzerland – already strangely enough – Italian law, but a Swiss 
court would apply Swiss law, following Swiss private international law. 
Both alternatives are not convincing, which means that private international law has to be 
taken into account to answer the applicability of Article 9 for some questions, while within 
Article 9 (regarding its content), private international law should not apply for the sake of 
                                                     
70  Schwarz, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht Recital 960; Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische 
Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 549. 
71  Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des 
Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 397. 
72 Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 384. 
73 Ibid. 
74 To the nearly universal ambit of the so-called „situs-rule“ Wendehorst, in: Sonnenberger, MünchKommBGB 
Volume 11 5th ed. Art. 43 EGBGB Recitals 3, 4. 
75  To the situation before non-European courts cf. Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und 
sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 452 f. with hints to 





increased clarity. The solution to this is that the application of Article 9 has to be restricted 
to a certain ambit. 
(iv) Teleology 
A teleological view on the questions seems to me to be supportive to this conclusion. 
Mindful of the bigger goals of private law, the harmonisation and unification of European 
private law, both alternatives of an unlimited application of Article 9 – the application of 
private international law in all cases, or in none – are not helpful. Both would in my opinion 
overreach the mark, the first one by giving away the advantages achieved through the 
approximation of company law in Europe, the second one by creating utter confusion even 
in easy cases. 
This leads me to the conclusion that indeed Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) does not determine the 
applicable law for all legal questions that the SE might encounter in its legal life. The Recital 
20 points already to this fact, but more importantly the systematic cohesion shows that the 
ambit of Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) is limited to the ambit of the SE-Regulation itself. Other 
questions are left to the private international law. 
b. Preliminary result: Discussion in the literature 
This view is shared by the dominating opinion among scholars in Germany76. The discussion 
goes back to earlier scholars who dealt with previous drafts of Article 977, but was taken up 
again after the final version of the SE-Regulation. Even if some scholars seem not to agree at 
first glance, this is often due to conceptual differences78, but there is no or not much 
difference in the matter. Brandt and Scheifele want to draw the “Regelungsbereich” 
(regulatory ambit) very wide79, while Wagner wants to apply Article 9 para. 1 lit. (c) up to a 
point “where the SE is affected as any other participant in legal transactions”80. The 
discussion is not limited to Germany, but seems to be most coherent here, in the sense that 
the authors note and refer to each other. Where the matter is mentioned or similar 
questions are touched upon, there seems to be no awareness of this discussion. This is 
apparently the case for Rescio81 (of 2003), who seems to be – other than the prevailing 
                                                     
76 Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz SE-VO Art. 9 Recital 15; Schäfer, in: Goette, 
Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz VO (EG) 2157/2001 Art. 9 Recital 7; Brandt and 
Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht”; Wagner, “Die Bestimmung Des 
Auf Die SE Anwendbaren Rechts”; Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-
Verordnung.” 
77 Lindacher, “Maßgebendes Recht, Auslegung und Lückenschließung,” 4 to whom dates back the term of 
“Regelungsbereich” (or “vocation européenne”);  referring to the draft of 1991 (COM 91/174/FINAL): Schwarz, 
Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht recital 955; Raiser, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft und die nationalen 
Aktiengesetze,” 282 f.; Grote, Das neue Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft zwischen europäischem und 
nationalem Recht. 
78 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 548 quote Wagner 
as representing the “wide interpretation” (which they repudiate) (p. 548, footnote 16) and say that he would 
“circumnavigate the problem” (p. 549, cf. footnote 21). Wagner, “Die Bestimmung Des Auf Die SE 
Anwendbaren Rechts,” 988 quotes in footnote Brandt / Scheifele as “having another opinion” but admits that 
they would probably reach the same result in most of the cases. 
79 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 551. 
80 Wagner, Der Europäische Verein, 68; Wagner, “Die Bestimmung Des Auf Die SE Anwendbaren Rechts,” 988. 





opinion in Germany – of the view that in such cases as of the law concerning e.g. the 
winding-up of companies (which would, due to Recital 20, not be regulated by Article 9 at 
all), the private international law is not applicable and the reference to the national 
(material) law is made by the European legislator. Although in his article he quotes a lot of 
literature in German, he does not explicitly refer to the discussion at this point; in fact, he 
does not quote the relevant articles. A similar lack of awareness is also the case for 
Colangelo82 (of 2005), who presents similar results like the German prevailing opinion but 
does so without referring neither to the German discussion nor to Rescio. 
The fact that the question is not raised in more literature is somewhat startling and may be 
due to the superficial treatment in many articles. Although the answer appears to be 
somewhat obvious, the argumentation is rather difficult, given that the wording points in a 
different way. For this specific question, the result is that the provision is not as clear as it 
could be and that so far, the doubts are not avoided neither by independent discussions in 
the single literatures nor by a common pan-European discussion. 
c. Determination of the ambit 
To determine the ambit, I will take a two-step approach: first, I will discuss possible methods 
to come to more concrete conclusions, and secondly, I will apply them to the different areas 
of law. 
(i). Methods to determine the ambit 
As for the methods, there is at least unanimity about one point which goes without much 
saying: the interpretation of the ambit has to be the same in all of Europe83, which rules out 
drawing e.g. on national codifications to determine the ambit. Otherwise, it would not be 
possible to realise the legal unity demanded by the European law as a functioning legal order 
in general – and repeated in Recital 6 of the SE-regulation in special (cf. above B I 2, p. 18 to 
both issues). Needless to say as well that the ECJ is the authority to ask in case of doubt, as 
has been affirmed already in the earliest writings on the SE84 and has been undisputed ever 
since, if the question was mentioned85. 
                                                     
82 Colangelo, “La ‘Società Europea’ alla prova del mercato comunitario delle regole.” Not entirely clear is in my 
opinion the statement on page 167, stating that in addition to the law of the seat, the private international law 
has to be taken into account for all matters beyond the ambit of the regulation (“che non trovino la loro 
disciplina nel regolamento”). Clearer on p. 168 (to the example of groups, the same example which also Lächler 
and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 386. use with the same 
result): the application of national law brings with itself the applicability of the provisions on the conflict of laws 
from the respective legal order. 
83 With the most detailed justification Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das 
Anwendbare Recht,” 550; Ficker, “‘Hilfsweise geltendes Recht’ für ‘Europäische Aktiengesellschaften’?,” 45; 
Schürnbrand, in: Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung Art. 9 SE-VO 
Recital 26; Schäfer, in: Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz VO (EG) 
2157/2001 Art. 9 Recital 7; Kuhn, in: Jannott and Frodermann, Handbuch der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft 
Chapter 2 Recital 36. See for further justification above p. 3 ff. on the interpretation of the SE-regulation in 
general. 
84 Namely Ficker, “‘Hilfsweise geltendes Recht’ für ‘Europäische Aktiengesellschaften’?,” 45. 





There is, however, dissent among scholars which methods the ECJ (and, therefore, lawyers in 
general, too) should apply. 
Some approaches which the literature has discussed in European company law in general 
have proven to be not very helpful in the specific context of the SE. This holds especially true 
for the confine proposed for the EEIG-regulation86 to distinguish between rules covering the 
internal relations of the company and such covering its external relations87. This may work 
for partnerships, but is difficult, or even impossible to apply to corporations, as they are 
legally more complex. This is because the SE-regulation also contains a number of rules 
whose purpose is the protection of persons outside the company – namely creditors –88 and 
it would be very strange to ban these rules from the ambit of the SE-regulation89. Such a 
result may be tolerable for the non-profit EEIG, but creditor protection has a higher 
importance in corporations, where there is no personally liable shareholder90. 
The ambit, therefore, has to be drawn wider, and most scholars would probably agree that 
whatever is “company law” should be within the ambit91. This term needs, of course, further 
specification. One thought though seems undeniable: wherever national law mentions the 
word for the national public limited company (instead of using the word “SE”), the SE-
regulation has to step in to declare this provision applicable for the SE92. This task would be 
fulfilled by Article 9. Otherwise, there would not exist any law applicable to that question, 
since without Article 9 SE-regulation, the national law would only apply to companies of 
national type, not to the SE. This may serve for the following as a rule of thumb to 
distinguish “company law” – to be understood as: law which deals with the peculiarities of 
companies – from “general law on legal transactions” – which treats companies the same as 
any other participant in legal transactions. Coached in another terminology, there should be 
a distinction between the “rules on organization” (within the ambit) and the “rules on 
behavior in legal transactions” (outside the ambit)93: this points in the same direction and is 
therefore true, but does not bring any further clarification in my opinion. 
                                                     
86 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG). 
87 As proposed by Meyer-Landrut, Die Europäische Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung, 16 – 20. In the draft 
of 2008 (COM (2008) 396), a similar distinction was realised with a view to the SPE  (cf. to that Schürnbrand, 
“Vollharmonisierung im Privatrecht,” 285 f.). 
88 To mention only a few: Art. 8 para. 4, para. 7, Art. 24 para. 1, Art. 34. 
89 On the draft of 1989 Grote, Das neue Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft zwischen europäischem und 
nationalem Recht, 101 f.; with reference to the SE-regulation Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische 
Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 550. 
90 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 550. 
91 Ficker, “‘Hilfsweise geltendes Recht’ für ‘Europäische Aktiengesellschaften’?,” 45; Wagner, “Die Bestimmung 
Des Auf Die SE Anwendbaren Rechts,” 988; Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche 
Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 456; Schürnbrand, in: Habersack and 
Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung Art. 9 SE-VO Recital 25; Kinler, in: 
Sonnenberger, MünchKommBGB Volume 11 6th ed. IntGesR Recital 82. 
92 See for an example below B II 2 d (ii), p. 23. 
93 Lindacher, “Maßgebendes Recht, Auslegung und Lückenschließung,” 3 f.; with doubts Grote, Das neue Statut 
der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft zwischen europäischem und nationalem Recht, 102 f.; Ficker, “‘Hilfsweise 





The rule of thumb needs further adjustment – this is already due to the fact that the 
member states may refer to the national type of public limited company in different cases; 
but the interpretation nevertheless has to be consistent throughout Europe. 
It is for the same reason hard to draw on the law of conflicts to find more concrete results94, 
since this is for the most part national law, and the progress in approximation of the laws of 
conflicts is by far not as big as the one regarding the approximation of substantive law95. 
Even though the methods of determining the ambit will have to be parallel to the processes 
used in private international law96, the results of the latter cannot – due to their national 
nature – be transferred without further ado to the ambit of the SE. They can be of help, 
however, if one ascribes them firstly only a supporting function, and resorts to them, 
secondly, after comparison of the laws of conflicts of several member states, as is also 
proposed by some scholars97. 
The SE-regulation itself can, however, provide further help in concretizing the ambit. 
One possibility is to look at the historical predecessors of the SE-regulation. The earlier drafts 
– this is most true for the first drafts of 1970 and 1975 – contained many more provisions, so 
that their ambit was also drawn in a clearer way. However, since there was never political 
consent about these earlier drafts, their ambit cannot simply be transferred to the SE-
regulation of 200198. Areas may have been omitted either because they are now supposed 
to be filled with national rules, to which Article 9 refers – meaning that these areas would 
still form a part of the ambit – or because the legislator decided that these areas are not 
supposed to be part of the ambit anymore99. However, a look at the history can be helpful 
insofar as it is likely to assume that whatever was not a part of the drafts in the 1970s is not 
supposed to be part of the ambit of the SE-regulation of today100. 
There has furthermore been – with reference to other legal frameworks – the proposal to 
draw on the density of regulation to determine the ambit101. For the current SE-regulation, 
however, this is not a very useful approach, since the idea of having a vastly applicable 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Anwendbaren Rechts,” 988 (“an end of the ambit is there, where the SE is affected like any other participant in 
legal transactions”); Geßler, “Grundfragen der europäischen Handelsgesellschaft,” 384. 
94 As is done by Lindacher, “Maßgebendes Recht, Auslegung und Lückenschließung,” 5; Caemmerer, “Kronstein-
FS,” 193. 
95 Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 384; Lächler, Das 
Konzernrecht der Europäischen Gesellschaft, 84. 
96 Wagner, Der Europäische Verein, 53. 
97  Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der 
europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 457; apparently similar already Ficker, “‘Hilfsweise geltendes Recht’ für 
‘Europäische Aktiengesellschaften’?,” 45. 
98  Too far therefore Schürnbrand, in: Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender 
Verschmelzung Art. 9 SE-VO Recital 27. The references he quotes are either more cautious than him (Brandt 
and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 551.) or do not refer to the 
drafts, but to a fictional full reglementation (Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 65 f.; Schäfer, in: Goette, Habersack, and 
Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz VO (EG) 2157/2001 Art. 9 Recital 7.). 
99 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 551. 
100 Ibid. 
101 For the EEIG Meyer-Landrut, Die Europäische Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung, 17 f.; for the European 





general reference provision comes with many intended gaps within the ambit. The absence 
of provisions on the European level does therefore not necessarily mean a gap in the ambit 
as well102. 
The system of the SE-regulation give some hints as to what is supposed to be part of the 
ambit. One can look at the legal matters which are regulated by the single provisions, but 
also at the headings which describe on an abstract level the legal areas which are may be 
deemed to be part of the ambit of the SE-regulation in any case103. 
(ii). Areas of law within and outside of the ambit 
If one tries to put these methods into practice, it is clear that especially the areas of 
formation and structure of the SE are within the ambit, as they constitute the largest part of 
the SE-regulation and as these are the titles given to Titles II and III of the SE-regulation. The 
latter includes especially features of the shares, rules on the liability, legal personality, 
agreements between shareholders, capital preservation, rules on raising capital and 
questions of liability104. 
Outside the ambit, since it is part of the “general law on legal transactions”, there is 
especially the law on contracts and on torts105. These legal areas do not distinguish between 
SEs and other participants in legal transactions and affect the SE like any other participant in 
legal transactions. The same holds true for the law merchant in general106, whereby the case 
of commercial registry law should be treated separately. Since it is regulated in Article 11 SE-
regulation, it falls inside the ambit107. 
The same holds true for the more specific areas mentioned in Recital 20: the SE-regulation 
does not cover taxation, competition, and intellectual property law108. 
The fourth area mentioned in Recital 20 – insolvency – may, however, deserve some closer 
attention, since Article 63 SE-regulation refers to legal provisions of the member states for 
“winding up, liquidation, insolvency [and] cessation”. This is at least at first glance surprising 
and seems to be contradictory to Recital 20109. Furthermore, it is not clear how the SE-
                                                     
102 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 551. 
103 Ibid., 550; Wagner, “Die Bestimmung Des Auf Die SE Anwendbaren Rechts,” 988; Kindler, in: Sonnenberger, 
MünchKommBGB Volume 11 6th ed. IntGesR Recital 82. 
104 Schäfer, in: Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz VO (EG) 2157/2001 Art. 
9 Recital 7; Schürnbrand, in: Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung Art. 
9 SE-VO Recital 27; similarly (for the European Association) Wagner, Der Europäische Verein, 54. 
105 Schürnbrand, in: Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung Art. 9 SE-
VO Recital 28. 
106 Schäfer, in: Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz VO (EG) 2157/2001 Art. 
9 Recital 7; Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 66. 
107 Schürnbrand, in: Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung Art. 9 SE-
VO Recital 27. 
108 Kindler, in: Sonnenberger, MünchKommBGB Volume 11 6th ed. IntGesR Recital 83; Schürnbrand, in: 
Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung Art. 9 SE-VO Recitals 25, 28. 






regulation relates to the Insolvency Regulation110. Scholars express indeed different opinions 
on how to solve these puzzles111. However, since Article 9 SE-regulation is not affected by 
this dispute – since Article 63 SE-regulation is the lex specialis – I will, given the limitation of 
space and of the chosen topic, not discuss this problem in this thesis. 
Co-determination law may as such be part of the ambit of the SE-regulation112, which 
contains some rules on co-determination questions (Art. 42 sentence 2, Art. 43 para. 3 
sentence 2, Article 45 sentence 2). However, the area is regulated in detail by the Worker 
participation directive. 
Transformation law deals with companies in particular, and its applicability does in wide 
parts depend on the specific legal form which an enterprise has chosen. Therefore, it seems 
convincing to include it into the ambit of the SE-regulation113. The fact that this legal area is 
regulated in some member states in a separate code can be of no importance, since a 
consistent interpretation for all of Europe is needed. In these cases, the SE-regulation would 
not only refer to the Stock Code of a member state, but also to its Transformation Code. 
However, it has to be noted that in the case of international transformations, it is 
acknowledged that both legal orders have to cooperate. If an SE is to be part of such a 
transformation, the SE-regulation determines only the transformation law applicable to the 
SE, not to that of the other company114. 
More disputed are the areas of the law of takeover and the law of groups, so that I will now 
dedicate each of them a short section. 
d. Law of Groups: specific questions I 
Of the four possible ways to establish an SE115, three lead ineluctably to an involvement of 
the new company in a group116, and in the case of the fourth way, too, it is probable that the 
SE will form part of a group of several enterprises117. Therefore, the law of groups has a 
special importance for the legal form of the SE which is more than likely to find itself 
embedded in such a structure. The SE-regulation itself, though, exerts “abstinence with 
                                                     
110 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings; Kuhn, in: Ibid. Chapter 2 
Recital 27. 
111 Cf. Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz SE-VO Art. 63 Recital 1 ; Schäfer Goette, 
Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz VO (EG) 2157/2001 Art. 63 Recital 1; 
Bachmann, in: Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung Art. 63 Recitals 
64 ff. Kiem, in: Kiem, Kölner Kommentar Zum Aktiengesetz, Volume 8 SE-VO Art. 63 Recitals 7 ff., 26. 
112 Schürnbrand, in: Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung SE-VO Art. 
9 Recital 29. 
113 Schürnbrand, in: Ibid. SE-VO Art. 9 Recital 27; Kindler, in: Sonnenberger, MünchKommBGB Volume 11 6th ed. 
IntGesR Recital 82. 
114  Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der 
europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 458 f. 
115 As in Article 2: merger (para. 1), formation of a holding SE (para. 2), formation of a subsidiary SE (para. 3), 
transformation of a company with a subsidiary (para. 4). 
116 Namely the possibilities 2 – 4 (Article 2, para.s 2 – 4). 





regard to law of groups”118 and only provides a few marginal norms (Art. 61 f. broach on the 
question of consolidated accounts, Art. 31 para.s 1 and 2 provide rules for the merger within 
a group). This has led to a comparatively broad range of dispute about whether the SE-
regulation covers question on the law of groups at all. Special interest is paid to the impact 
of the SE on relationships between companies from different member states, a rather 
common problem since the provisions on the set-up of an SE provide that the companies 
need to stem (at least in the moment of the set-up) from different member states. 
The interest in the question may well be triggered by concerns that rules to protect the 
controlled company (respectively its minority shareholders and creditors) are circumvented 
if the company is controlled from abroad, so that in the end, rules from the legal order of the 
controlling company might apply119. To this date, no unified European law or idea about the 
law of groups exists120. Tentatives have so far not come to results121. Special legal provisions 
on a national level exist mainly in Germany and Portugal122, recently (since the Company Law 
Reform of 2004) also in Italy123, which might help explain the fact why most literature on this 
topic, too, is German. (The other countries rely on the law of torts and general means of civil 
and company law124.) 
Nevertheless, on the European level, there is at least consensus on the rules of private 
international law with regard to the law of groups, which state unanimously that the legal 
order of the controlled company shall be applicable125. This holds true for the discussion on 
the SE as well, where the problematic case is the one in which the SE is the controlling 
company and controls a company from another country. For the law of groups, 
commentators agree that in this case, the legal order (of the country) of the controlled 
                                                     
118 Hommelhoff, “Einige Bemerkungen zur Organisationsverfassung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 282 
(“konzernrechtliche Enthaltsamkeit”); with reference to him Brandi, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft im 
deutschen und internationalen Konzernrecht,” 890; same phrase used by Habersack, “Das Konzernrecht Der 
Deutschen SE - Grundlagen,” 737. 
119  Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der 
europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 445; Jaecks and Schönborn, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, das 
Internationale und das deutsche Konzernrecht,” 256. 
120 The Ninth Directive exists only as preliminary drafts from 1974/5 (DOK XI/328/74 and DOK XI/593/75) and 
1984 (DOK III/1639/84). For the SE, too, the rules on the law of groups (Artt. 220 – 240 in the draft of 1970 and 
Artt. 225 – 240d in the draft of 1975) were abandoned since the draft of 1989. The Seventh Directive (Seventh 
Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983) at least presupposes the existence of groups. For the 
international gamut of solutions cf. also Lutter, Konzernrecht Im Ausland.. 
121 For the history of European law on groups cf. Schwarz, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht Recitals 887 - 920. 
The Forum Europaeum Konzernrecht, therefore, restricted itself to proposing only a core harmonization, 
Forum Europaeum Konzernrecht, “Konzernrecht für Europa,” 767. 
122 So (with reference to the Member States of the EU at the time) Habersack, “Das Konzernrecht Der 
Deutschen SE - Grundlagen,” 740; Brandi, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft im deutschen und 
internationalen Konzernrecht,” 890 Footnote 18; Schwarz, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht Recital 868. 
123 Sasso, “The European Company: Does It Create Rules for the Market or a Market for the Rules?,” 298. 
124 Schwarz, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht Recital 867 f. 
125 As is reflected by Recital 15. See for the different possibilities to justify this Einsele, “Kollisionsrechtliche 
Behandlung des Rechts verbundener Unternehmen,” 41 ff.; Kindler, in: Sonnenberger, MünchKommBGB 
Volume 11 6th ed. IntGesR Recital 681; Brandi, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft im deutschen und 





company should govern the group relationship126. The Recitals 15 and 16, too, seem to 
reflect similar concerns127. However, given the wording of Art. 9 which refers – without 
visible exemption for the law on groups – to the “law of the Member State where the SE has 
its registered office”, this view seems to run counter to the existing law. 
In legal literature, there exist three different approaches (which, as mentioned, come to the 
same conclusion, but differ with regard to the doctrinal argumentation). Still, I believe it 
fruitful to engage in the argumentation with them since I believe the doctrinal questions 
posed by the law of groups to be a good opportunity to clarify the structure of Art. 9128. This 
is because the doctrinal structure developed so far does not suffice to answer the questions 
regarding the law of groups, because the problem investigated here is special because of the 
following features: 
First, the SE figures in a group possibly as controlled and / or controlling company. This 
means that it is not enough to distinguish between what is company law and what is not. 
Even if the law of groups is included in “company law” (for which there are good reasons129), 
it has to be distinguished whether the ambit of Article 9 includes the law of groups for the SE 
in all situations or not. (Otherwise, it might come to the cumulative application of different 
regimes, e.g. when one SE controls another SE seated in another member state – Article 9 
would then refer to the law of groups of both member states.) This is why it is not enough to 
simply point to the fact that the law of groups is part of company law. 
The other specialty is that the SE-Regulation is part of all national legal orders of member 
states. Therefore, the answer to the question which legal order to apply is not a step 
forwards if the result is always the SE-regulation. This is the reason why private international 
law alone cannot give the answer to the questions raised here. 
The third feature of the problem is that there is no law of groups in the SE-regulation, but 
member state law for the law of groups is not necessarily applicable to the “SE”, but may be 
geared towards national legal forms. The answer which legal form to apply would then have 
to be given by Article 9. 
                                                     
126  Jaecks and Schönborn, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, das Internationale und das deutsche 
Konzernrecht,” 256 f.; Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des 
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128  A similar approach is taken by Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche 
Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 444 (abstract before “I.”). 
129 Ibid., 446; Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 386; 






The first two approaches which try to answer the question have in common that they apply 
in the end the rules of private international law to all cases of the law of groups, but do so in 
different phases of the application of the provision. 
(i). First approach: comprehensive referral 
A first way is to read the reference in Art. 9 to national law (at least) for questions regarding 
the law of groups as a comprehensive referral130. They start from Recital 15 (the reference to 
the general principles of private international law) and read it so that by way of exception, 
Article 9 refers to the private international law of the member states for the law of groups. 
I will give reasons why Art. 9 has to be read as a transmission provision in a later chapter (B 
III 4, p. 49). For the purpose of this chapter, I will therefore only point out that such an 
exception is not justified even if taking into account Recitals 15 and 16. 
Any exception to the principle that Article 9 refers to substantive law needs very good 
reasons as it would destroy the delicate structure of the already complex provision. The idea 
sometimes to apply private international law in the application of Article 9 and sometimes 
not would be unexpected and complicated for any lawyer who has to work with the 
provision. The wording of Article 9 does not give any clues to this distinction either. The 
functioning of Article 9 would be bifurcated completely – on the one hand, it would be a 
provision of private international law, on the other hand a provision sui generis with a 
function decisively different131 from the law of conflicts. It is true that Recitals 15 and 16 
point to the fact that private international law has to be taken into accounts for these 
questions, but this point of the application is the wrong place. It would presuppose the 
applicability of the SE-regulation as a whole on the level of private international law (also for 
questions on the law of groups), but call this into question on the next level. The private 
international law would therefore be situated at a very unexpected place. Proponents of this 
view also have trouble of explaining the sense of Recital 17132. Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that to read Article 9 as a comprehensive referral does not always provide for 
                                                     
130 Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 385 f.; Lächler, Das 
Konzernrecht der Europäischen Gesellschaft, 107; Brandi, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft im deutschen 
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Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 396; Kindler, in: Sonnenberger, MünchKommBGB 
Volume 11 6th ed. IntGesR Recital 78. 
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the result which everybody aims at especially in the law of groups133. For the lack of good 
reasons to do otherwise, it is therefore better to see Article 9 as a transmission provision in 
this area, too. 
(ii). Second approach: exemption from the ambit 
The second way134 is to exempt questions regarding the law of groups from the ambit of Art. 
9 altogether. They draw on Recital 15, too, but read this as exempting the law of groups 
from the ambit, parallel to the areas mentioned e.g. in Recital 20 (taxation, competition, 
intellectual property, insolvency)135. 
One problem with this approach is that law of groups and company law are intertwined136. 
In many member states, the law of groups consists in the modification of general company 
law, and the use of the law of groups of a different member state would run counter to legal 
certainty so that the exemption of the law of groups from the ambit is not helpful137. It 
would also mean to ascribe to Recital 15 constitutive effect, which it should not have, being 
merely a recital, and would result in a hardly convincing bifurcation of the general 
provision138. 
Further problematic with this second approach is that it is then not clear how the applicable 
law of groups should be determined. Habersack speaks of the “substantive law which is 
determined by the rules of private international law”139. The problem is that private 
international law does not determine a specific law of groups for the SE. The answer that 
private international law gives us would be “German law” or “Dutch law”. But e.g. in German 
law, there exist different provisions regarding the law of groups for Aktiengesellschaften or 
GmbHs. The private international law does not tell us which rules to apply, which is by no 
means surprising since it is not its task. National law outside the SE-regulation, i.e. the 
provisions on the law of groups, if they exist, do not tell us either, since they would not 
mention the “SE” at all. The answer has to come from the SE-regulation, and indeed, 
Habersack turns to the SE-regulation, but strangely applies Art. 10 to determine that the 
applicable law of groups is the one applicable to the Aktiengesellschaft140. It is not only 
                                                     
133  Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der 
europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 446 f. 
134 Habersack, “Das Konzernrecht Der Deutschen SE - Grundlagen,” 724 ff., 742; Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 67; 
Veil, in: Jannott and Frodermann, Handbuch der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft Chapter 11 Recital 3; with this 
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“Das anwendbare Konzernrecht der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 1856; following Habersack without own 
argumentation Maul, “Konzernrecht der ‘deutschen’ SE - Ausgewählte Fragen zum Vertragskonzern und den 
faktischen Unternehmensverbindungen,” 743; and Maul, “Das Konzernrecht der Europäischen Gesellschaft”; 
similarly Lind, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, Eine Analyse der Rechtsanwendungsvorschriften,” 130. 
135 Habersack, “Das Konzernrecht Der Deutschen SE - Grundlagen,” 728; Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 67. 
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137  Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der 
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138 Schürnbrand, in: Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung Art. 9 SE-
VO Rn. 36. 
139 Habersack, “Das Konzernrecht Der Deutschen SE - Grundlagen,” 742. 





contradictory to what he argued before141 – that the SE-regulation is not applicable to these 
questions – it is also not clear why it should now be Article 10 instead of Article 9 to 
determine the applicable law, given that Article 10 declares itself subsidiary to Article 9142. 
It is further not possible to read Recital 16 as referring directly to the national law on groups, 
thereby taking the law on groups out of the ambit of the SE-Regulation143. Admittedly, in its 
German version, Recital 16 refers to the “rules and general principles”144 which could be 
read as a reference to the substantive law of the member states, which would then apply in 
line with private international law. However, the German version is probably the outcome of 
a mistranslation145, since other language versions refer to the “rules and general principles 
of private international law”146. Independently from the number of language versions which 
have the one or other version (which usually is not a valid criterion), the reference to private 
international law in Recital 16 makes more sense. This is what Recital 15 refers to, and the 
reference to “the” or “these” principles (like in the German or Spanish version: “die 
allgemeinen Vorschriften”, “esas normas y principios generales”) seems to refer to 
something mentioned before. 
(iii). Third approach: SE-Regulation only applies to the controlled company 
The third way is to say that the SE-regulation is on the level of substantive law only 
applicable to the law of groups for the controlled company, i.e. that it only determines the 
applicable law if the SE is the controlled company. Where this position is contended in 
literature, for the most part I have found in the literature no precise justification147. Still, this 
is the view which I find the most convincing view. 
It was already mentioned that on the level of private international law, the SE-Regulation 
does not provide for the applicable legal order in the field of the law of groups. This question 
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142 It is doubtful if Article 10 has any ambit at all next to Article 9. If there is one, one needs to look for it outside 
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82 that the law of groups is part of the ambit insofar as the SE-Regulation determines that the legal order of 
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is left to the private international law of the member states. This clearly follows from the 
Recitals 15 and 16. Recital 16 refers to the “rules and general principles of private 
international law” for “both where an SE exercises control and where it is the controlled 
company”. This means that the ambit of the SE-Regulation as a whole – including Article 9, 
logically – is restricted when answering questions of private international law: it does not 
provide answers for the law of groups. This answer would be provided by the private 
international law of the member states, which would usually refer to the legal order of the 
controlled company. 
The ambit of the SE-Regulation on the level of substantive law, however, is different and 
does include the law of groups. This is not only because if the ambits on both levels were the 
same, there would hardly be any value in the distinction. It is because there is need for an 
answer on the level of substantive law which only the SE-Regulation can give, but neither 
private international law (i) nor other substantive law (ii) can. 
(i) Firstly (as set out already above), the answer received by the rules of private international 
law – e.g. “German law” or “French law” – is not sufficient, because national law may, as in 
the case of Germany, distinguish between laws for the Aktiengesellschaft (the German 
pendant to the European Company) and other companies. Here, an “intra-personal law of 
conflicts”148 is needed on the level of substantive law, a task which only the SE-Regulation 
can fulfil. 
(ii) Secondly, national law outside the SE regime (i.e. other substantive law: in Germany e.g. 
the AktG) does not give an answer either. It simply does not mention the SE and does not 
give any rules for a group including an SE because it only regulates the national types of 
companies. 
There is therefore need for Article 9 to determine that, on the level of substantive law, the 
law of groups for the Aktiengesellschaft is applicable, not that of the GmbH. (Article 10 is not 
the correct norm to apply here, cf. B II 2 d (ii), p. 36.) This is exactly what is meant by Recital 
17 which reads: 
The rule thus applicable where an SE is controlled by another undertaking should be 
specified, and for this purpose reference should be made to the law governing public 
limited-liability companies in the Member State in which the SE has its registered 
office. 
Since the recital itself is not binding, it can only announce such a reference, not give it itself. 
As many scholars noticed149, it used to refer to Article 114 in the previous draft of 1989, 
which stated: 
1. Where an undertaking controls an SE, that undertaking’s consequent rights and 
obligations relating to the protection of minority shareholders and third parties shall 
                                                     
148  Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der 
europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 451 (“interpersonelle[s] Kollisionsrecht”). 
149 Ibid., 449; Jaecks and Schönborn, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, das Internationale und das deutsche 





be those defined by the law governing public limited companies in the State where 
the SE has its registered office. 
2. […] 
This provision was omitted in the following versions of 1991 as well as in the final version of 
2001 because the legislator believed that because of the general reference provision (Art. 7 
in the draft of 1991, now Article 9), Article 114 was not needed150. The same idea applies to 
the present regulation where Article 9 fulfils the task of referring to the law which would 
apply to a public limited-liability company. The problem is just that Article 9 now refers to 
this public limited-liability company also in the case that the SE is the controlling company. 
This is indeed somewhat “surprising and irritating”151 and has been deemed a clerical 
error152. Indeed, the wording seems to point to a result which – as the history shows – was 
not intended by the legislator. This lack of consistency in the teleology is also apparent from 
the Recitals 16 and 17: Recital 16 states that private international law should be applicable. 
Even in the case that the controlling company is an SE, this could result in the applicability of 
the legal order of a member state, which would include the SE-regulation. Nevertheless, 
Recital 17 sees a need to declare applicable the laws for a special public limited company 
only for the case of a controlled SE. Even though the wording of Article 9 is therefore 
misleading, the clear intent of the legislator can be assessed using judicial methods. This 
means that given the history and the teleological background of the provision, Article 9 is on 
the level of substantive law only applicable for the controlled SE, not for the controlling SE153. 
Cases where both the controlling and the controlled company are SEs with seats in different 
member states would be decided along the same lines. Private international law would refer 
to the legal order of the controlled SE. This would be a national legal order including the SE-
regulation which refers to law of the seat of “the SE”, which could in theory indeed be both 
the controlling or the controlled SE. Applying the same thoughts and ideas, it would be clear 
that the reference is only made for the case that “the SE” is the controlled SE. 
In this way, the result which everybody aims for would be reached, but I believe this 
justification to be in line with the Recitals, the historical background of the SE-Regulation 
and the system which Article 9 presupposes, even if it is not spelled out clearly. 
                                                     
150 As evident e.g. from the briefing of the German Federal Government versus the German Parliament 
(Bundestag) regarding the Draft of 1991, BT-Drs. 12/1004, p. 11. 
151 Habersack, “Das Konzernrecht Der Deutschen SE - Grundlagen,” 740. What is indeed irritating, though, is the 
fact that Habersack himself takes this view – that Art. 114 of the draft of 1989 was superfluous – in one of his 
earlier publications: Habersack, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht Recital 402. 
152  Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des 
Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 445; Habersack, “Das Konzernrecht Der Deutschen 
SE - Grundlagen,” 740; Lächler, Das Konzernrecht der Europäischen Gesellschaft, 100. 
153 Similar result in Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des 
Rechts der europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” passim, esp. p. 458 ((on the level of substantive law), the SE-






e. Takeover law: specific questions II 
The law on capital markets in general is (and as far as I see it, all scholars agree to that) 
outside the ambit in as far as it regulates the behavior and the functioning of markets in 
general. The takeover law, however, has a bearing on company law questions insofar as it 
partly regulates the behavior of organs of the involved companies. 
This has led some scholars to differentiate between takeover law which has a bearing on 
such organs (which should be within the ambit of Art. 9) and takeover law which has not 
(this should be applied according to private international law)154. This distinction, however, 
appears artificial and tears the takeover law apart155. It seems more convincing to regard the 
provisions that regulate organs’ behaviour, too, as part of the takeover law which as a whole 
is not part of the ambit of Article 9156. 
3. Preliminary result 
The discussed problems show that the applicability may not be clear at first glance, but 
clarification can be reached through discussion. More problems, though, are to come in the 
field of content. 
III. Content 
In this section, I will deal with a couple of questions concerning the content of Article 9. I will 
focus on four discussions and only broach or mention remaining discussion due to lack of 
space (B III 5, p. 53). 
1. Freedom to adopt statutes 
One question that arises when interpreting Art. 9 SE-regulation is how far the party 
autonomy goes. Art. 9 declares twice that a European company is regulated by the 
“provisions of its statutes”, in Art. 9 para. 1 lit. b and in Art. 9 para. 1 lit. c (iii). In lit. b, 
however, the reference to the statutes is made “where expressly authorized by this 
Regulation”, in lit. c, the reference depends on the member state law that would apply to a 
Public Limited company. Both levels of reference, although referring to the same legal 
source157, have to be distinguished when it comes to the question of how far the party 
autonomy goes. This is, if the matter is mentioned at all, undisputed158. (The question, 
                                                     
154 First of all Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 386 f.; 
and Lächler, Das Konzernrecht der Europäischen Gesellschaft, 92; following them Hommelhoff, 
“Normenhierarchie für die Europäische Gesellschaft,” 14; Teichmann / Hommelhoff, in: Lutter and Hommelhoff, 
SE-Verordnung, Kommentar Art. 9 SE-VO Recital 24; the same, but apparently without awareness of the 
problem Kalss, “Der Minderheitenschutz bei Gründung und Sitzverlegung der SE nach dem Diskussionsentwurf,” 
638. 
155 Veil, in: Kiem, Kölner Kommentar Zum Aktiengesetz, Volume 8 Art. 9 SE-VO Recital 45; Kuhn, in: Jannott and 
Frodermann, Handbuch der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft Chapter 2 Recital 28. 
156 In addition to the authors from the previous footnote also Schürnbrand, in: Habersack and Drinhausen, SE-
Recht mit grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzung Art. 9 SE-VO Recital 28. 
157 Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 70; Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz Art. 9 SE-VO Rn. 5; 
less clear (“one source of law... of bifurcated nature”) Wagner, “Die Bestimmung Des Auf Die SE Anwendbaren 
Rechts,” 986. 
158  Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des 
Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 388 (footnote 24); Grundmann and Möslein, “Die 





though, seems to be only discussed in countries, i.e. against a national background, which 
provides stricter limitations to the freedom to adopt statutes, namely Germany and, to a 
lesser extent, France.) The second level (lit. c (iii)) is clearly dependent on the member state 
law159, meaning that in countries like Germany where the rigid Art. 23 para. 5 of the German 
Stock Code (AktG) applies, or in France160, there is less freedom than in other countries like 
Ireland or the United Kingdom161. The European level, on the other hand, establishes a rule 
of its own, at first glance not less strict than e.g. the German rule, or even stricter162. 
Nevertheless, the question has arisen if there could not be a wider interpretation of lit. b, 
saying that only rules which deviate from the European law are forbidden, while 
complementary rules (understood as rules that cover matters not regulated by the European 
law) could be allowed163. Even though this distinction appears to be clearly inspired by a 
member state legal order, in this case Art. 23 para. 5 (sentence 2) of the German Stock Code, 
the question is justified. This is because because the previous provision, Art. 7 of the Draft of 
1991 – the first draft to mention the Statutes of the SE – did not contain any clarification 
either, compared to the finally adopted version164 and in the meantime, the clarification, 
especially against the background of the rather solitarily strict German provision, was 
declared a goal of further legislation165. 
a. Wording and history 
Starting from the wording, the word “authorizes” implies that at this level, the statutes need 
“permission” to apply. Complementary provisions, i.e. provisions on matters which are not 
mentioned by the regulation, are not “expressly authorized” and therefore not covered by 
Art. 9 para. 1 lit. b. The wording in other languages, as French, German, Italian, or Spanish, 
appears not less clear. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Fleischer, “Der Einfluß der Societas Europaea auf die Dogmatik des deutschen Gesellschaftsrechts,” 517; 
Blanquet, “Das Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft (Societas Europaea SE), Ein 
Gemeinschaftsinstrument für die grenzübergreifende Zusammenarbeit im Dienste der Unternehmen,” 48 f.; 
Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 555; Hirte, “Die 
Europäische Aktiengesellschaft,” 5; Menjucq, “La société européenne, Règlement CE n° 2157/2001 et directive 
2001/86/CE du Conseil du 8 octobre 2001,” sub II A 3. 
159 This is, if the questions is raised, answered in this way with unanimosity. Representatively for many others: 
Colangelo, “La ‘Società Europea’ alla prova del mercato comunitario delle regole,” 169. 
160 Menjucq, “La société européenne, Règlement CE n° 2157/2001 et directive 2001/86/CE du Conseil du 8 
octobre 2001,” sub II A 3. 
161  Blanquet, “Das Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft (Societas Europaea SE), Ein 
Gemeinschaftsinstrument für die grenzübergreifende Zusammenarbeit im Dienste der Unternehmen,” 49 (with 
implications for possible regulatory competition). 
162 Hommelhoff, “Satzungsstrenge und Gestaltungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 272; Lutter, 
“Europäische Aktiengesellschaft - Rechtsfigur mit Zukunft?,” 4. 
163 The question was first posed by Hommelhoff, “Einige Bemerkungen zur Organisationsverfassung der 
Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 287; already more doubtful Hommelhoff, “Satzungsstrenge und 
Gestaltungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 272; the question was especially picked up by 
Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 70 f.; and Schäfer, in: Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz Art. 9 VO (EG) 2157/2001 Rn. 26. 
164 Cf. COM(91) 174 final in the annex. 





The historic argument is not very helpful. The draft of 1991 contained the same constellation. 
Although the question had been raised already166 and the legislator apparently knew this 
need for further clarification167, the lack of amendments is somewhat startling, but in any 
case no clear hint to either interpretation. At best, the argument that the prevailing view on 
the previous drafts was that there were no complementary rules in the statutes allowed168, 
could be used to support the view that – since the legislator saw no need for change – now, 
too, complementary rules are not supposed to be covered by lit. b. 
b. Systematic interpretation 
From a systematic point of view, it leads to an ambiguous result to resort to the other 
reference provisions in the regulation. Provisions which explicitly refer to the statutes (such 
as Article 39 para. 4, Article 40 para. 2, 3, Article 43 para. 2, 3, Article 44 para. 1), would not 
be obsolete if lit b. would be interpreted in a wider way. They could still disambiguate some 
cases where the statutes can or have to provide rules, in the sense of a non-exhaustive list. 
Other cases could exist, because they were intentionally neglected by the legislator or 
because he foresaw the possibility that he might not see some cases. But these reflections 
do not provide cogent arguments, either, to support the view that complementary 
provisions in the statutes have to be taken into account. 
The most telling provision to draw on may be lit. c (iii). If the complementary rules of the 
statutes would fall under lit. b, they would also prevail against national law which would be 
cogent for any normal Public Limited-Liability Company of the respective member state. 
Moreover, national law is, as states lit. c, only applicable where European law “does not 
regulate a matter”. But this would also be the definition of the complementary provisions 
above, meaning that these and national law would have exactly the same ambit. This would 
not leave any room for a coherent and senseful interpretation of lit. c. 
This system might become more plain in languages such as French or English where there is 
an “or” dividing the lit. a and b on the one hand from lit. c, stressing hereby the condition for 
lit. c “matters not regulated by this Regulation”. This could explain why legal literature in 
these languages apparently finds it sufficient to just quote wording and repeating – before lit. 
a and b – the condition “matters regulated by the Regulation”169. 
                                                     
166 Lindacher, “Maßgebendes Recht, Auslegung und Lückenschließung,” 8; to the draft of 1989 Hommelhoff, 
“Gesellschaftsrechtliche Fragen im Entwurf eines SE-Statuts,” 434. 
167 Wiesner, “Überblick über den Stand des Europäischen Unternehmensrechts,” 624 stating further need for 
clarification. 
168  E.g. Schwarz, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, Recitals 1097, 1101; Raiser, “Die Europäische 
Aktiengesellschaft und die nationalen Aktiengesetze,” 283 (“freedom to adopt statutes falls prey to 
nationalism”); less peremptory Hommelhoff, “Gesellschaftsrechtliche Fragen im Entwurf eines SE-Statuts,” 434. 
169 Colombani and Favero, Societas Europaea, 52; Beguin, “Le rattachement de la société européenne,” 40; da 
Costa and Bilreiro, The European Company Statute, 14; Werlauff, “The SE Company - A New Common European 






Teleologically, it is not clear whether the legislator favours member state law (meaning that 
lit. (b) does not over complementary provisions) or the statutes170. The recitals remain tacit 
on this specific topic. Even if one takes into account the big goals – to establish a functioning 
legal order, to unify law and to establish a common market (see above) – this would favour a 
as far as possibly unified legal order. Alone, it is not clear if this goal is better achieved by 
restricting freedom to adopt statutes – this freedom could be used to have even within one 
country interminably many different kinds of companies – or by allowing it (since it is 
possible that the market would lead to a “best” solution which could be adopted uniformly 
transnationally). However desirable a larger amount of freedom to adopt statutes may be171, 
this is not clearly enough reflected as a goal of the legislator in the law. Only the principle of 
subsidiarity, mentioned in Recital 29, could be used as an argument in favour of the opinion 
that member state law should prevail: only in so far as necessary, European provisions would 
prevail against member state provisions. If the freedom that the European provision could 
provide by allowing “complementary provisions” is not necessary to achieve the goals of 
unification and establishment of a common market, the teleological argument, too, shows a 
(slight) prevalence for not allowing “complementary provisions”. 
This view would be supported by a legal comparison, which shows that the German 
provision is a mere exception172. Since apart from this result there is, as laid out above, less 
that would support the concept of “complementary provisions”, this rather supports the 
view that the question is born against a national background. 
This result is supported by the fact that the question is, as far as I see, only discussed by 
German scholars where – given the peculiarities of the strict German law – the wish to 
obtain the desired freedom with help of European law may have been father to the thought. 
In other discussions, there is just a mere repetition of the wording. Even where the 
questions of Art. 9 are discussed in width, there is no mentioning of the question173. Since all 
arguments, as seen above, point rather to the view that there should not be any such thing 
as “complementary provisions” on level lit. b, I find this view convincing also given the 
                                                     
170 Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 71. maintains that „the body stipulating the statutes is in principle deprived of the 
competence to regulate by the European provisions“ and that „Art. 9 para. 1 lit. c (iii) entrusts first the national 
law with the task of filling out the gaps”, but does not give any specific reasons. He quotes Schwarz, 
Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, Recital 1096., but he who wrote before Hommelhoff posed the question in the 
first place. Casper’s argumentation seems to rely mainly on the wording, but given the problem posed by 
Hommelhoff, his argumentation appears to me to merely beg the question. 
171 This wish is especially uttered by Lutter, “Europäische Aktiengesellschaft - Rechtsfigur mit Zukunft?,” 4; and 
Hommelhoff, “Satzungsstrenge und Gestaltungsfreiheit in der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 272; on the 
questionable historic reasons for the German provision Spindler, “Regeln für börsennotierte vs. Regeln für 
geschlossene Gesellschaften - Vollendung des Begonnenen?,” 598 ff.; Werlauff, Erik, SE, The Law of the 
European Company, 24; from a French point of view Menjucq, “La société européenne, Règlement CE n° 
2157/2001 et directive 2001/86/CE du Conseil du 8 octobre 2001,” sub II A 3. 
172 Wiesner, “Überblick über den Stand des Europäischen Unternehmensrechts,” 624. 
173 Rescio, “La Società Europea Tra Diritto Comunitario E Diritto Nazionale,” 979 – 982 even though there is a 





specific European background. It is also in line with the prevailing opinion in Germany174 and, 
as far as the question is discussed, abroad175. 
2. The question of the use of principles in Art. 9 
One special feature of the SE-regulation is the lack of content, result of the politically 
delicate negotiations and transposed into law by bountiful use of referential provisions. The 
lack of legislative content can be used to argue in two main ways. 
a. Overview over the discussion 
One possible line of argumentation would be that this lack increases the need of 
systematically relying on other secondary law because the SE-regulation itself often remains 
tacit. To this day, there exist a number of attempts to establish a systematic framework 
within the European company law which do not start from single judgments but aim at 
establishing a doctrinal framework for the existing European company law176. There has 
been research in this area regarding procedural rules regarding restructuring177, the liability 
of those acting on behalf of a company prior to registration178 and the “image of the 
shareholder in European company law”179. Undertakings like these are facilitated by the 
increasing inclination of national legislators to open up towards comparative approaches, 
filling the lacunae of European company law with content180. This has led many scholars to 
endorse the use of principles as a mean of systematic interpretation181. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that Article 9 SE-regulation does not aim at a full 
harmonization of the legal matter182. Some claim that therefore it is not possible to draw on 
other secondary law to find by means of interpretation a legislative content which was not 
                                                     
174 Schäfer, in: Goette, Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz Art. 9 SE-VO Rn. 26; 
Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz Art. 9 SE-VO Rn. 5; Grundmann, European 
Company Law, § 33 Recital 11 (footnote 32); apparently also Göz, “Beschlussmängelklagen Bei Der Societas 
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Privatrecht,” 36 f. 
175 Menjucq, “La société européenne, Règlement CE n° 2157/2001 et directive 2001/86/CE du Conseil du 8 
octobre 2001,” sub II A 3; Werlauff, Erik, SE, The Law of the European Company, 24; Colangelo, “La ‘Società 
Europea’ alla prova del mercato comunitario delle regole,” 168 f. 
176 Schön, “Das Bild Des Gesellschafters Im Europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht,” 5 f.; Teichmann, “Die Einführung 
Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des Europäischen Statuts Durch Den 
Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 405. 
177  Hommelhoff and Riesenhuber, “Strukturmaßnahmen, insbesondere Verschmelzung und Spaltung im 
Europäischen und deutschen Gesellschaftsrecht.” 
178 Kersting, “Societas Europaea: Gründung und Vorgesellschaft.” 
179 Schön, “Das Bild Des Gesellschafters Im Europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht.” 
180 Montalenti, “La società per azioni a dieci anni dalla riforma: un primo bilancio,” 420 f. 
181 Teichmann, “European Company-A Challenge to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners, The,” 327; 
Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des Europäischen 
Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 408 f.; Raiser, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft und die 
nationalen Aktiengesetze,” 283 and 297; Wulfers, “Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze als ungeschriebenes Recht der 
supranationalen Gesellschaftsrechtsformen,” 106; similar, but without any argumentation Engert, 
“Gesellschaftsrecht” Recital 110; Rescio, “La Società Europea Tra Diritto Comunitario E Diritto Nazionale,” 979 
(footnote 32). 






supposed to exist on a European level at all183. National law rather than European unwritten 
principles is meant to be applied. Resorting to secondary law should therefore be allowed 
only to a very limited extent (only insofar as it is possible to draw on other, concrete 
provisions; so-called “rule-conducted analogy” as opposed to “principle-conducted analogy” 
where one can only draw on principles)184. 
b. Arguments used so far in the discussion 
There are two main lines of argumentation to support this view. 
One line of argumentation runs like this: in the previous drafts of 1970185 and 1989186, there 
was an explicit referral to the principles of the Regulation. This reference was omitted in the 
draft of 1991 and is now not part of the SE-Regulation. This has caused many scholars to 
refuse the application of general principles187. Others, however, point out that there is no 
need for such a reference, since the Community law bears such a character due to the 
member states’ tacit consent to the judiciary of the ECJ188. The change as opposed to the 
versions of 1989 and 1970 has also been attributed to the insight that at this moment, there 
existed too few principles, and that tasking literature and jurisprudence with the finding of 
such principles would have been asking for too much. Such an insight would then, of course, 
be bound to the time of the legislation and by no means irrebuttable, and would merely 
have to be seen as a challenge for literature and jurisprudence189. To me it seems most 
convincing to argue that a clear distinction between the acts of ascertaining a lacuna (where 
the application of general principles of European law is undoubtfully needed) and filling it is 
hardly possible in practical life190. Any theoretically possible distinction between them would 
seem purely conceptual and of no help in solving problems of interpretation. 
                                                     
183 Especially Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003”; Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz SE-VO Art. 
9 Recital 10; Bachmann, “Die Societas Europaea und das europäische Privatrecht,” 54 f.; Schäfer, in: Goette, 
Habersack, and Kalss, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz VO (EG) 2157/2001 Recital 15. 
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Regulation, but not expressly mentioned herein, shall be governed: (a) by the general principles upon which 
this Regulation is based […]” 
187 Namely Bachmann, “Die Societas Europaea und das europäische Privatrecht,” 55; Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 
56. 
188  Wulfers, “Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze als ungeschriebenes Recht der supranationalen 
Gesellschaftsrechtsformen,” 106. 
189  Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des 
Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 409 who unfortunately does not support his view 
with further references. 





Another argument is the risk of legal uncertainty that allegedly an adoption of “principle-
conducted analogies” would pose. Clarity is beyond doubt a most important feature, 
especially at the crucial point of Article 9 and given the aims of the SE-Regulation to establish 
a functioning legal order (cf. B I 2, p. 18). According to those who are reluctant towards an 
application of principles, only in the case of “rule-conducted analogy”, the benefits of using 
an analogy would outweigh the risk of legal uncertainty191. But the distinction between 
“rule-conducted analogy” and “principle-conducted analogy” is far from clear either192. If 
legal certainty is the aim, it seems counterproductive to introduce a new distinction into the 
already complex Article 9. Furthermore, with the already high and growing density of 
regulation on the European level in European company law, there is less and less space for 
legal uncertainty even if principles from European law are to be applied. 
c. Resolving the dispute: an intermediary approach 
To find a final answer to this problem, one has first of all to take into account the 
peculiarities of the European legislation. The national (esp. German) methodology to 
distinguish between intended and unintended gaps in the law does not fit in the European 
context193. The provision of Article 9 does purposefully refer to member state law and is as a 
measure of “vertical law of conflict” as such unparalleled in the member state laws194. It is 
therefore of limited use to look for “unintended” gaps in the SE-Regulation195. Furthermore, 
Brandt and Scheifele have pointed to the fact that the distinction between intended and 
unintended gaps is hazy and hard to apply and that the long history of legislation might have 
undisclosed most gaps in the concept already, so that most gaps would have to be treated as 
intended gaps anyway196. 
As for the gaps, may they be intended or unintended, the differing opinions may not be as 
far apart from each other as it initially seems197. As has already been said, the distinction 
between “rule-conducted analogies” (which both sides would agree upon to allow) and 
“principle-conducted analogies” seems blurred right from the start. Furthermore, many 
possible questions may be beyond discussion as it is commonly agreed that lacunae which 
can only be filled on a European level need to be filled with analogy to other European law, 
not by resorting to member state law198. An example of this would e.g. be the subsequent 
                                                     
191 Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz SE-VO Art. 9 Recital 10. 
192 This is also admitted by those who endorse it: Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 55 (footnote 30); Bachmann, “Die 
Societas Europaea und das europäische Privatrecht,” 55. 
193 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 551 f.; not 
convincing on the other hand Wulfers, “Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze als ungeschriebenes Recht der 
supranationalen Gesellschaftsrechtsformen,” 108. 
194 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 551 (for the 
German Civil Law). 
195 See for problems in applying the „national“ methodology to this aspect Teichmann, “European Company-A 
Challenge to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners, The,” 326 ff. 
196 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 552. 
197 Somewhat in between both opinions also Kuhn, in: Jannott and Frodermann, Handbuch der Europäischen 
Aktiengesellschaft Chapter 2, Recital 16. 
198 Wagner, “Die Bestimmung Des Auf Die SE Anwendbaren Rechts,” 989; Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 59; Brandt 





lack of fulfilling the criterion of multiple nationality, laid down in Article 2 of the SE-
Regulation199. 
As for the remaining contentious points, it has to be noted that the if and how of passing the 
SE-Regulation point to the fact that the European legislator favours a solution on a European 
level as far as possible. By establishing a European legal form which is supposed to provide a 
legal and economic unit for businesses (Recital 6) the legislator gave effect to his will for a 
unity on a European level. Furthermore, the European legislator referred in the SE-regulation 
in 22 provisions (in just 70 articles) to provisions of European company law other than 
Directive 2001/86/EC200 and by doing so apparently presupposed the coherence and system 
of the legal order201. The reference in Recital 9 to the progresses in the approximation of 
national company law, too, stresses the belief of the European legislator in the coherence of 
company law on a European level202. It would therefore be in line with the will of the 
legislator to draw on other secondary law, especially the other Company Law Directives, to 
interpret the Regulation in line with the will of the European legislator. Even if there may not 
be many cases to apply these principles, scholars and courts alike are called upon to develop 
principles wherever possible203. 
Finally, it is without doubt that the whole context of the SE-regulation has to be taken into 
account to ascertain the content and ambit of Article 9. This means that the recitals that play 
an important role in the interpretation of European law can have a bearing on the 
interpretation of Article 9. Some recitals may help to determine the ambit of Article 9 (as 
already seen above, B II 2 c and d). The other, more specific, referential provisions – as 
mentioned, some scholars count up to 84 of them204 – of the regulation have to be 
considered, too. They would prevail over Art. 9 para. 1 SE-Regulation not only due to the 
principle of speciality205 but already because Art. 9 para. 1 itself declares that the provisions 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Rechtsgrundsätze als ungeschriebenes Recht der supranationalen Gesellschaftsrechtsformen,” 108; Bachmann, 
“Die Societas Europaea und das europäische Privatrecht,” 55. 
199 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 553. Bachmann, 
“Die Societas Europaea und das europäische Privatrecht,” 55 (footnote 136) believes this example to be an 
exception; while Wulfers, “Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze als ungeschriebenes Recht der supranationalen 
Gesellschaftsrechtsformen,” 108 apparently believes that there will be many examples like this. 
200 Recital 9 (“work on the approximation of national company law has made substantial progress”), Recital 26, 
Art. 3 para. 2, Art. 9 para. 2, Art. 12 para 1, Art. 13, Art. 17 para. 2, Art. 18, Art. 21 lit b, Art. 22, Art. 28, Art. 31 
para. 1, Art. 32 para. 3, 4, Art. 33 para. 3, Art. 37 para. 5, 6, 7; Art. 62 para. 1, 2; Art. 66 para. 5, 6; Art. 67 para. 
2; Art. 69 lit. b, not to speak of Directive 2001/86/EC (15 references). The quoted directives are both Company 
Law Directives (the twelfth, (89/667/EEC) of 21 December 1989, the first (68/151/EEC) of 9 March 1968, the 
third (78/855/EEC) of 9 October 1978, and the second Directive (77/91/EEC) of 13 December 1976) and others, 
relating to financial institutions (2000/12/EC) and annual accounts (91/674/EEC, 90/604/EEC). The directives 
most often referred to are the Third (11 times) and First (8 times) Directive. 
201 Schön, “Das Bild Des Gesellschafters Im Europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht,” 7 (to the previous draft of 1991). 
202  Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des 
Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 409. 
203 Similar appeals in Raiser, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft und die nationalen Aktiengesetze,” 283; 
Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des Europäischen 
Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 409. 
204 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 547. 





of “this regulation” shall have the highest rank206. This can result in a sequence of several 
provisions which have to be checked in a specific order207. 
3. “And” or “or” between Art. 9 para. 1 lit. (b) and (c) 
Another – minor – problem of interpretation concerns the relationship between the 
different parts of Art. 9 para. 1. 
The German Notary Association208 mentioned differences between the German (and, e.g., 
Dutch) version of the text, which does not contain a word between lit. (a) and (b) of Art. 9 
para. 1, on the one hand, and e.g. the English, French, Italian or Spanish version (cf. annex), 
which contain an “or” or its respective equivalents209. The German Notary Association draws 
from this the conclusion that in all other language versions, the lit. a – c of Article 9, 
paragraph 1 would interact, couched in Boolean terms, as follows: 
 
A AND (B OR C), 
 
the parenthesis being represented by the “or”; while in the German (and Dutch) version, this 
would come to 
 
A AND B AND C210. 
 
But since both alternatives, lit. (b) and (c), are, due to the conditions that introduce them, 
mutually exclusive (a case can only be either explicitly referred to – it would then be covered 
by lit. (a) or (b) – or not, then (c)), it would make no difference for their application even if, 
as suggested, the German text would have to be read as containing an “und” (and)211. 
Therefore, even if there should be difference in interpretation, these differences would not 
have any effect on the clarity or workability in the second part of the thesis. 
                                                     
206 Brandt and Scheifele, “Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 553. 
207 Ibid., 554 f. with a concrete example. 
208  Deutscher Notarverein, Stellungnahme zum Diskussionsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung der 
Europäischen Gesellschaft vom 24. Juni 2003. 
209 In theory, all 24 versions should have to be compared, which I will not undertake in the course of this work 
due to linguistic reasons. Given, though, that these are the most commonly used languages and that most of 
the discussion will be around these versions, I will refrain from drawing on translations. The German Notary 
Association, too, restricts itself to these five languages. With the exception of the Dutch version, which is like 
the German one, most other language versions seem to follow the English / French and so on. The Polish 
version explicitly has an “enclitic” or (“lub”), Boolean: “AND/OR”, as opposed to “albo”, which would be “either 
– or”.  
210  Deutscher Notarverein, Stellungnahme zum Diskussionsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung der 
Europäischen Gesellschaft vom 24. Juni 2003, 3. 






4. Comprehensive referral or transmission provision 
Regarding the content of Article 9, especially the question whether Article 9 refers to 
member state law including its rules of private international law (comprehensive referral) or 
directly to its substantive law (transmission provision) has been disputed. Although most 
scholars agree that the rule should be understood as a transmission provision212, this is at 
least not entirely clear at first glance and there are scholars which take the opposite view213. 
a. Wording 
The wording refers to “(i) the provisions of laws adopted by Member States in 
implementation of Community measures relating specifically to SEs” and “(ii) the provisions 
of Member States' laws which would apply to a public limited-liability company”. “Provisions 
of law” appears to be a rather ambiguous term which could refer to both substantive law 
only or to the whole legal order of a member state including its private international law. 
In the EEIG-regulation214, contrariwise, the European legislator still distinguished between 
different wordings for “national law”215 (used e.g. in Article 24 EEIG-regulation, to express a 
comprehensive referral) and “internal law”216 (used e.g. in Article 19 EEIG-regulation, the 
counterpart to Article 9 SE-regulation, to express a transmission provision). In the SE-
regulation, however, the wording “national law” does sometimes appear217, but in some 
cases seems to refer to purely substantive law. For example, in Article 3 para. 2218, it is 
referred to the “provisions of national law implementing the twelfth Council Company Law 
Directive” – but this Directive will be only implemented by the means of substantive law, not 
in the member states’ private international law219. (There is then, indeed, the common 
                                                     
212  Engert, “Der international-privatrechtliche und sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der 
europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 447; Lächler, Das Konzernrecht der Europäischen Gesellschaft, 84 f.; Lächler 
and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 384; Brandt and Scheifele, 
“Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft Und Das Anwendbare Recht,” 553; Casper, “Ulmer-FS 2003,” 67 (footnote 
66); Kuhn, in: Jannott and Frodermann, Handbuch der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft Chapter 2 Recital 19; 
Wagner, “Die Bestimmung Des Auf Die SE Anwendbaren Rechts,” 987; to the draft of 1989 Grote, Das neue 
Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft zwischen europäischem und nationalem Recht, 50; to the European 
Association Wagner, Der Europäische Verein; generally speaking Schwarz, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht 
Recital 960. 
213  Expressing sympathy for this position already Teichmann, “Die Einführung Der Europäischen 
Aktiengesellschaft, Grundlagen Der Ergänzung Des Europäischen Statuts Durch Den Deutschen Gesetzgeber,” 
396 f.; decidedly then ibid., in: Lutter and Hommelhoff, SE-Verordnung, Kommentar Art. 9 SE-VO (§ 1 SEAG) 
Recitals 28 ff. The discussion is apparently not known to Panico, “Il Regolamento della società europea e le 
fusioni transfrontaliere,” 38 – 41, esp. p. 40 who consider this solutions “more logical”; and Malatesta, “Prime 
osservazioni sul regolamento CE N. 2157/2001 sulla società europea,” 617 (footnote 12). 
214 Above footnote 86. 
215 In German: „einzelstaatliches Recht“, in French: „loi nationale“, in Italian: „legge nazionale“, in Spanish: „ley 
nacional“. 
216 In German: “innerstaatliches Recht”, in French: „loi interne“, in Italian: „legge interna“, in Spanish: „ley 
interna“. 
217 E.g. in the Articles 9 para. 3, 29 para. 4, 31 para. 1, 32 para. 3, 33 para. 3, 37 para. 9, 47 para. 4, 49, 54 para. 
2, 56, 62 para. 1 and 2, 65, 66 para. 6 
218 Similar Art. 37 para. 7. 
219 Thus – speaking for all references to implementing provisions of directives - Schwarz, Europäisches 
Gesellschaftsrecht Recital 960; with reference to the special references in the SE regulation in general Brandt 





understanding that these special reference provisions are to be read as transmission 
provisions, and most scholars simply refer for most cases to the wording to support this 
view220.) In any case, there is no use of the wording “internal law” which is somewhat 
inconsistent221. The wording is therefore not really helpful. 
b. History 
A look at the history – the preliminary drafts of the SE-regulation – reveals that in the draft 
of 1991 (and similarly in that of 1989), the respective provision referred to “the provisions of 
the law on public limited companies of the Member state in which the SE has its registered 
office”. While Engert suggests that this wording could have been kept if the legislator had 
wanted to refer to substantive law222, I do not see why this wording should have been a 
statement. (Maybe, the German wording has a stronger tendency towards this direction, 
referring to “dem im Sitzstaat […] geltenden Recht”.) In fact, commentators on this previous 
draft, too, do agree that the provision was meant to be a transmission provision, but do not 
draw mainly on the wording, but on the teleology223. However, since it is not known why the 
legislator changed the wording in the current version, and because of the absence of a 
systematic use of the wording in the current regulation, it is hard to draw any conclusions 
from this change of words. 
c. Systematic interpretation 
If compared to other provisions, a systematic interpretation yields that usually, European 
provisions refer to substantive law224, and exceptions are usually marked as such225. As 
another systematic point, one could mention the fact that before the application of Article 9, 
there is already an application of private international law. It could appear strange to apply 
European law in the first place without the application of collision provisions, but then to 
apply such provisions when the European law refers to member state law. This, however, 
does not constitute a cogent justification. 
Not clear is the role of the fact that Article 7 SE-regulation demands that registered office 
and head office of the SE be in the same member state. This is geared towards the dispute 
between the two big theories in European private international company law – which 
choose as the connecting factor either the actual seat of administration (seat theory) or the 
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place of registration (incorporation theory)226. This dispute was supposed to be overcome by 
the requirement that the head office has to remain where the registered office is. If the 
requirement is fulfilled, both theories would come to the same result. Therefore, the 
legislator also believed not to have taken sides in the conflict, as is apparent from Recital 
27227. This neutrality of the SE-regulation, however, can be used to argue in two different 
ways: on the one hand, one can say that this neutrality makes the application of private 
international law easier, so that Article 9 now can be understood as referring to private 
international law without creating too much confusion or legal uncertainty228. But this 
argument can be countered by saying that the provision of Article 7 could well be subject to 
review. Even if now, with the European Commission’s refusal to any further reform steps in 
the near future229, the reference to Art. 69 SE-regulation may not be of much more 
relevance230, it is still valid to point to the recent developments of the ECJ judgments, which 
may soon be reflected231 – or have to be reflected, as some say232 – in the SE-regulation. 
Most decisive from a systematic point of view seems to be after all the rule that usually, 
European provisions refer to substantive law. There is no clue in the SE-regulation nor is it 
apparent from its broader context that this should be different in the case at hand. 
d. Teleology 
The teleology behind the SE-regulation – and Article 9 in special – is the goal to create a legal 
form as uniform as possible. While some state that the current outcome of the SE-regulation 
is now expression of the re-nationalisation of the SE233, it has to be maintained that currently, 
too, the legislator aimed at a functioning legal order, where economic and legal unit of a 
business coincide as far as possible, as is reflected in Recital 6 (cf. also Recital 10). To 
                                                     
226 Cf. Grundmann, European Company Law § 7 Recitals 4 - 10. 
227 Recital 27 reads as follows: “In view of the specific Community character of an SE, the ‘real seat’ 
arrangement adopted by this Regulation in respect of SEs is without prejudice to Member States’ laws and 
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sachrechtliche Anwendungsbereich des Rechts der europäischen Aktiengesellschaft,” 455. 
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229 Cf. Document COM(2012) 740 final from the 12.12.2012, “Action Plan: European company law and 
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p. 14. 
230 So still Lächler, Das Konzernrecht der Europäischen Gesellschaft, 85. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Various authors claim that Art. 64 para. 2 SE-regulation may not be in line with primary European law: 
Wymeersch, “The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in European Company Law,” 692 f.; Ziemons, “Freie Bahn für 
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das europäische Privatrecht,” 43 with further references (footnote 114). 






function, it is necessary that courts in all member states would apply provisions of the same 
legal orders to the one concrete SE at issue. This is secured in the safest way by reading 
Article 9 as a transmission provision234. Otherwise, it might be possible that the law of third 
countries could be applicable in some cases235 or that courts in different countries would 
apply the laws of different countries to the same SE236. At least, any additional application of 
laws of conflicts would further complicate the matter which would be detrimental to the 
desired legal clarity of the provision. The argument that the discussion about the regulatory 
ambit is complicated, too, and that in some cases (as is argued by some), interpretation 
along the lines of private international law is needed (e.g. in the context of the law of 
groups)237, is in my opinion not convincing. Both questions are settled on different levels, 
and the answer to the latter question does not influence the need to discuss the first 
question. When applying Article 9, the interpretation of it as a comprehensive referral does 
by no means exempt the lawyer from the application of its regulatory ambit. The 
comprehensive referral, too, could only be applied within the ambit of regulation of Article 9. 
Another argument which is brought forward by the proponents of a comprehensive referral 
is the equal treatment with regard to companies of national law238. They argue that – as 
already Article 9 encapsulates the principle of equal treatment, not only Article 10239 – for 
SEs, the same rules apply which would apply for companies of national law. Since with 
regard to the latter, rules of private international law would undoubtedly apply in all cases 
which have a bearing on a foreign country, this should also be the case for an SE. Admittedly, 
rules of private international law should apply to the SE. However, this does not mean that 
the reference in Article 9 should be read as a comprehensive referral; private international 
law should instead be applied before entering into the application of the SE-regulation (cf. 
above B II 1, p. 22). Moreover, it would not lead to completely equal treatment if Article 9 
was understood as a comprehensive referral: in this case, courts of all member states would 
apply to an SE with its seat in Denmark the Danish provisions on the conflict of laws, while 
they would apply the provisions on the conflict of laws of their own member state on a 
Danish aktieselskalber240. 
Another point is that Recital 9 reflects the legislator’s intent to benefit from the “substantial 
progress” that has been made in the field of national company law approximation since the 
drafts from 1970 and 1975. This progress, however, has been made only in the field of 
                                                     
234 Kindler, in: Sonnenberger, MünchKommBGB Volume 11 6th ed. IntGesR Rn. 81; Wagner, Der Europäische 
Verein, 987; Grote, Das neue Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft zwischen europäischem und 
nationalem Recht, 50; Kuhn, in: Jannott and Frodermann, Handbuch der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft 
Chapter 2 Recital 19. 
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substantive law where the Company Law Directives apply, not in the field of private 
international law. Therefore, it would make more sense to understand the reference which 
“may be made to the law governing public limited-liability companies in the Member State 
where it has its registered office” (Recital 9) as referring to the approximated substantive 
law241. Indeed, the purpose of private law approximation is to overcome the difficulties 
linked to the application of private international law242. 
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the consequences of an infringement of the 
requirement in Article 7 are by no means that the company ceases to exist243. As is laid down 
in Article 64, the member state where the registered office is has the task to “chase” the SE’s 
head office, i.e. to take measures to force the SE to either transfer its head office or to 
amend its registration. For this period, however, the different theories on the connecting 
factor in Europe would indeed yield different results if private international law were to be 
applied. This is not the case if Article 9 would be read as a transmission provision, since in 
that special situation, too, its reference to the law of “the Member State in which the SE has 
its registered office” (Art. 9 para. 1 lit. c (ii) ) would be unambiguous. 
Therefore, while wording and history seem not to provide any results, system and teleology 
support the view to read Article 9 as a transmission provision. This view, hence, appears to 
be more convincing. It also seems to be the view of the ECJ244 which has – admittedly, 
without nearer justification and with regard to the parallel provision of Art. 2 para. 1 EEIG-
regulation – applied substantive law245. 
5. Other discussions 
I will not deal some other smaller discussions with here. Partly, these discussions are 
relevant only for one country, as is the case for the question to what extent the German 
“Holzmüller/Gelatine-Rechtsprechung”246 is transferrable to the SE, or the question if the 
“traditional” Italian model could be adopted in an SE as well247. An interesting problem 
which cannot be dealt with because of lack of space is the question of a “SE-specific 
                                                     
241 Lächler and Oplustil, “Funktion Und Umfang Des Regelungsbereichs Der SE-Verordnung,” 384; Lächler, Das 
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interpretation of national public company law”, well-contended in German 248  (and 
Austrian249) legal literature. Other discussions seem to be far less contended250, especially 
the concise description of the “pyramid of norms”. Although different scholars count 
different numbers of levels (from 3 to 7), there is no real disagreement between them, and 
the divergence can be reduced to differing degrees of distinction251. 
IV. Preliminary Result 
This chapter shows that Article 9 indeed gives rise to several discussions. While some can be 
solved rather easily or are of not much interest for the European provision as they stem 
from a particular background, other discussions point to unclarities in the provision which 
have to be overcome by the use of logic and juridical reasoning. While part of the fact that 
mainly German literature was used may be due to the nationality of the author, the 
discussion seems, to say it cautiously, indeed not be lead all over Europe with the same 
intensity. I will leave it for a later chapter to draw conclusions from this finding (C I 3, p. 57). 
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Volume 8 Art. 9 SE-VO Recital 2 footnote 5; Casper, in: Spindler and Spilz, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz Art. 9 





C. Second Part. Advisability of Article 9 
Having assessed the major issues in interpreting Article 9, I want to assess the suitability of 
Article 9 as a whole. The question I want to answer is: if the European legislator was to face a 
similar question again, could a solution like Article 9 be recommended? Or would it be better 
to advise against any such regulation, so that the legislator should refrain from similar 
undertakings rather than to pass a similar compromise again? 
An answer to that question cannot be a simple value on a scale of “suitability”. What “good 
law” actually is has always been subject to discussions in the political sphere. There are 
several criteria to measure “good law”, and not all of them are undisputed. An answer 
therefore will have to point out the implications of Article 9 in several dimensions which will 
be discussed below. 
Among the rather uncontested yardsticks for “good law”, clarity may rank first. It should go 
without saying that any law should try to be as clear as possible and not give rise to disputes, 
misunderstanding and a variety of possible interpretations. Some authors may even go as far 
as to claim a constitutional right to clarity in law252. This is why the assessment will start with 
assessing the clarity of Article 9 in section C I, p. 56, drawing from the results of the first part 
(above “B”) of this thesis. 
Another criterion which does not need much justification is the workability of the regulation. 
Since the legislator announced in the Recitals that the Regulation would “permit the creation 
and management of companies with a European dimension, free from the obstacles arising 
from the disparity and the limited territorial application of national company law” (Recital 7) 
and that it would “be possible at least to create such a company” (Recital 10), this can be 
taken as a yardstick to assess in C II, p. 58, whether the European legislator met his own 
expectations. 
More discussion is necessary to assess the implications of Article 9 for regulatory 
competition. Given that there is still discussion about whether regulatory competition leads 
to a “race to the top”, “to the bottom” or “to nowhere in particular”, a two-step approach 
seems adequate: firstly, I will try to assess how much Article 9 contributes to regulatory 
competition in European company law. It will take a second step to clarify if such regulatory 
is desirable at all or if the legislator should not rather try to avoid it to ban the danger of a 
“race to the bottom” (C III, p. 60). 
A similar approach seems in place when it comes to discussing the prospect for the 
extension of the SE-regulation to a complete optional instrument (C IV, p. 69). Not only does 
it seem unclear if a compromise as embodied in Article 9 is a stepping stone on the way to a 
more harmonised company law or rather puts an end to harmonisation: The latter seems 
possible since compromises on the European level are often hard to overcome (danger of 
“fossilisation”). But here, too, it is not clear if the complete optional instrument would in all 
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aspects be a better solution than the instrument available at present. Here, again a two-step 
approach would try to answer both parts of the question. 
After all, I will sum up the results of the assessments and draw conclusions on the suitability 
of Article 9 (next chapter D, p. 75). 
I. Clarity 
To assess the clarity, I will first briefly dwell on the implications of the provision’s complexity 
(1), then touch on some problems in interpreting the provision (2) and end by giving a brief 
outlook to what role legal literature can play in improving the clarity (3). 
1. A word on compexity 
Art. 9 SE-regulation is undoubtedly complex in that it creates a delicate “pyramid of norms” 
with (this depends on the way it is counted) up to 7 hierarchical levels. However, complexity 
in itself is not a problem to the modern man who is “familiar with complexity”253, and indeed, 
there is hardly any real divergence of opinions as to the hierarchical structure introduced by 
the norm (cf. above B III 5, p. 53). 
2. Problems in interpreting Article 9 
The real problems lie somewhere else. As is clear from the discussion above in B II, p. 21 ff., 
Article 9 first does not clearly state what its regulatory ambit is. It has to be deduced using 
logical reasoning, the Recitals and other provisions of European company law. Even though 
thusly a convincing result can be reached, a clearer mentioning in the law would be in place. 
By way of a juxtaposition similar to the draft of 1989 (cf. B II 2 a (ii), p. 24), the existence of 
such a regulatory ambit could be made more clear, but it holds also true for the most 
contended areas, e.g. the law of groups. To this end, Recital 15, 16 and 17 should be re-
stated with regard to the fact that on the level of substantive law, the SE-regulation 
determines only the law for the controlled company. 
The same goes for the use of principles in the interpretation of the SE-regulation. Given the 
history of the wording and the growing density of regulations and thus principles in 
European company law, the provision could state more explicitly if principles are to be 
applied or not – similar like Art. 7 para. 1 (a) of the draft of 1970 (in the first case) or by 
inserting the words “without recourse to” (in the second case)254. 
A third complex of questions regards the private international law. The relation between the 
reference in Article 9 and private international law should be clarified by the legislator, too. 
This concerns both questions of the applicability of Article 9 (and the SE-regulation as a 
whole) as well as its content (the question whether it contains a comprehensive referral or a 
transmission provision). The first question could be answered already in the Recitals, in a 
similar way that Recital 20 is worded now, the second question could be clarified by a non-
equivocal use of the wording (like the way it was done in the EEIG-regulation). 
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3. The role of Legal Literature 
Legal literature has certainly a key role in pointing to these points. In fact there is a vivid 
discussion about the abovementioned questions especially in Germany. Legal literature 
therefore could fulfil a warning function to draw the legislator’s attention to the issues that 
need clarification. 
Legal literature, however, at this point does not seem able to overcome the problems alone. 
This is not because for many questions several opinions exist; this is a fact that is 
encountered in most legal areas. The real reason is that not all of those affected by the SE-
regulation engage in the discussion. As has been mentioned above several times, most 
discussions remain a mainly German affair. The real border seems to be the language, as also 
Austrians share the same discussions255 (and partly even Swiss scholars256, even though in 
Switzerland as of now no SE can be founded). In other member states, affected by the same 
regulation, many of these problems are not mentioned at all. This may be due to another 
understanding of legal literature in other countries. While in Germany many scholars see it 
as their task to anticipate possible legal problems once the legislation is passed, this may be 
so to a lesser degree in other countries where the literature merely follows or accompanies 
the case law. The fact that there is not yet much case law about the SE may hinder a richer 
discussion in other countries. 
Legal literature does not seem to have reached a stage where it discussions can freely cross 
language barriers. Even though several of the problems discussed in German language are 
accessible to scholars in other member states through translations or parallel publications of 
books257, English language journals258 or via quotations by scholars from abroad259, there are 
few contributions to the problems from other countries260. At the same time, much of the 
German legal literature does not seem to show much more interest in literature from abroad. 
There may not even be a development towards a more European discussion. While language 
barriers may become more and more permeable, barriers in mentality may persist. The 
rather technical and anticipating reflection about future problems may remain a mainly 
German affair. A look at other discussions may confirm this: in discussions like about the 
utility of regulatory competition (cf. below C III, p. 60), also German scholars seem to 
unhesitatingly draw on foreign literature to a fare more vast extent than they do in doctrinal 
affairs. The discussion about the SE has, in my judgment, even lost internationality: the 1976 
book, edited by Lutter, still drew heavily also on foreign literature, culminating in a 
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bibliography where out of 364 titles, only 134 were in German language, 94 in French, 51 in 
Italian, 39 in Dutch and 37 in English261. But it seems that with time, not only the enthusiasm 
about the “truly European” legal forms slackened, the discussions became more national, 
too. A bibliography about the year of 1988 already lists 22 purely German titles for 
“European company law” (few of which deal with the actual SE)262. Another list from 1990 in 
a German journal lists 58 titles, out of which 52 were German263. In today’s more technical 
treatises in Germany, however, mainly German literature is quoted: e.g. in the “handbook” 
by Habersack and Drinhausen (eds.), the literature quoted at the beginning of each Article 
contains 140 titles for the introduction and the first 9 Articles (sometimes overlapping), of 
which only 2 are not in German (but in English). Similar numbers arise for the Münchener 
Kommentar (184 titles for the introduction and the first 9 articles, of which 176 are in 
German; the 8 English titles are all mentioned in a section on “Legal comparison”) or for 
single articles  in treatises (the “Kölner Kommentar” mentions 70 only German titles for 
Article 9, the “SE-Kommentar” by Lutter and Hommelhoff mentions 40 titles, among them 3 
English titles). Often even where there is an English version or translation of a book or essay, 
only the German version is quoted264. 
Although these numbers can only give a first superficial glance at the literature in the 
different countries, they suggest that the discussion might even have developed from a 
rather pan-European discussion to a rather isolated German discussion in German dealing 
with the interpretation in high technical and doctrinal detail. At this point, I do not want to 
give a verdict whether the discussion should move on to more European topics in Germany, 
too, or whether other countries should tackle the problems posed by the German 
scholarship as well. 
For the purpose of this paper, it may suffice to conclude that it would be wrong to pose too 
many hopes in the literature as a means to overcome the discussion. Currently it looks as if 
only ECJ judgments could fan a pan-European discussion. Since any such verdict requires a 
certain acceptance in the practice and since such acceptance will heavily depend on the 
clarity265, the legislator should – in case it were to adopt a similar provision again – better try 
to clarify the abovementioned points in the first place. 
II. Workability 
Where this question is adressed in the literature, there is both light and shadow. On the 
negative side, the lack of clarity and bigger legal uncertainty are mentioned as probably 
deterring when firms want to incorporate as an SE. On the other hand, the fact that now 
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many rules remain on the national level is seen positive from a psychological point of view. A 
company which is still national in its core may easier be accepted266 by possibly eurosceptic 
workforce and customers. Another reason that the absence of rules is even seen as positive 
are “positive network externalities”267: the fact that now many rules apply which are already 
known (to the firms or their respective legal counsels) could make the transition smoother 
and therefore create greater acceptance for the SE268. Thus, the higher transaction costs 
caused by the complex delimitation can be alleviated269. 
When we turn to the facts, we see that the SE is accepted to a certain degree. Until today, 
2410 SEs have been established270, including many big companies like MAN SE, Porsche 
Holding SE, Fresenius SE and BASF SE. The continuous growth of the number of SEs is well 
documented in literature271; only in the first half of 2015, 165 new SEs were founded272. 
This numbers, however, look more moderate if compared to other figures. Out of the 2.399 
companies founded until the 1st of July 2015, only 346 were “normal” SEs, i.e. operating 
companies (not shell companies) with 5 or more employees273. Out of these 346 companies, 
170 were in Germany274, the country which has been leading the SE statistics for a long time 
now. Indeed, there exists a big gap between countries where so far no SE has been founded, 
like Italy where only two SEs exist as a result of cross-border mergers275, and countries which 
account for most of the SEs, like Germany. But even there, the number of SEs looks small 
compared to other types of company which are still by far predominant even in Germany 
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(e.g. as of the 1st January 2010, out of 17.935 public limited companies, only 116 were SEs, 
236 were organised as a KGaA276. In the meantime, the SEs have overtaken the KGaA277). 
Two main factors can in my eyes not be belittled: the continuous growth of the number of 
SEs (higher than that of national companies), and the fact that numerous global players 
chose the SE. Both factors will result in a greater acceptance of the SE in the future, the 
latter because of the role model function of the bigger companies. But while there is growth, 
the absolute numbers may still be below of what was accepted. Here it may hold true what 
has been assumed already in the literature: indeed, a case study by auditors Ernst & Young 
mentions legal uncertainty about the applicable law as one of the biggest obstacles for 
enterprises seeking to adopt the legal form of an SE278, a result which has been confirmed by 
other reports as well279. 
The result for the “workability” question therefore is: Article 9 does work in practice, but it 
could work better if the provision was more clear. 
III. Regulatory competition and regulatory arbitrage 
The showpiece example of regulatory competition is the company law of the United States, 
where Delaware famously holds the top position with most incorporations for nearly 100 
years now280. The question whether this system can be exported to Europe has been much 
discussed281. However, since there have already been at least a  few examples for regulatory 
competition in European company law282, this chapter will try to assess the impacts of Article 
9 on a possible regulatory competition (1) and then assess its desirability (2). 
Given the abundance of legal literature on the topic of regulatory competition, it does not 
come as a surprise that different mechanisms are discussed under the same term. The 
following paragraphs will thereby have recourse to a definition which understands 
regulatory competition as a situation where the persons concerned by a legal rule are able 
to choose the legal order which is supposed to be applicable for the matter at issue – be it a 
purchase, the inception of a company or a marriage. The person can thus be termed as a 
“customer” who chooses “law as a product”. The supply side is represented by those 
providing the law – if they want to attract as many customers as possible, they will try to 
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design the law as suitable to the customers’ needs as possible283. The discussion will be, as 
far as the supply side is concerned, limited to those providing the law - the question whether 
there is competition between different statutes284 will not be a subject of this chapter. 
Furthermore, the discussion will mainly focus on the demand side, sometimes termed 
“regulatory arbitrage”285 as opposed to “regulatory competition”, i.e. the question whether 
those concerned by the law exert choice. The question whether legislators actually do 
compete for “customers” may be different from the United States for some reasons (see 
below C III 1 a and b, p. 61 ff.), but is of lesser importance for assessing the suitability of 
Article 9. 
Several aspects of regulatory competition can be distinguished, and the following chapter 
will distinguish and focus on two of them: “horizontal competition”, which means the choice 
between the legal orders of different member states (e.g. French-style company or Societas 
Europaea on the one side vs. German-style company or Societas Europaea on the other), and 
“vertical competition” (French-style public corporation vs. French-style Societas Europaea)286. 
Other forms of competition, e.g. that between different company structures (one-tier vs. 
two-tier model)287, will not be subject of the following discussion, since it is of lesser general 
interest. As far as data is available, it suggests that decision making in this question is mainly 
dependent on national peculiarities288. 
1. Does Article 9 SE-regulation favour regulatory competition? 
The history of the SE-regulation is still young, and there is not much empiric evidence 
whether companies in Europe exert regulatory arbitrage. Before touching upon empirical 
data (c), I will therefore first discuss the literature. Since heretofore, the primary example of 
regulatory competition is the situation in the US, I will dedicate a section to comparison 
between EU and US (a) before focusing on the European side (b) and concluding (d). 
a. Comparison EU – USA 
When looking at the United States, comparisons often reveal that most features which are 
seen as furthering regulatory competition in the US do not exist in Europe. 
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This certainly holds true for a lot of features. It has been said that the US company law 
regulatory competition is the outcome of a historical development. Momentum has built 
and the path dependency that comes with it perpetuates the situation, a factor absent in 
Europe289. In Europe, the capitalisation of companies depends to a higher degree upon 
borrowed capital, which empowers banks usually not interested in changing the company 
law290. Furthermore, company law in Europe is not geared unilaterally towards the interests 
of the shareholders, but is meant to strike a balance between the interests of such different 
groups as shareholders, workforce and creditors. Even if the shareholders wanted to choose 
a company law more favourable to them, they might find it hard to enforce such a change 
with the creditors or the employees if the new company law is less favourable to them291. 
Other authors see rather the managers as the driving force between the regulatory arbitrage 
in the US. While more powerful in the US due to a more dispersed ownership, in Europe 
their power is more often restricted by majority shareholders292. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that changing the company seat in the US remains largely without changes to the 
taxes. In Europe, however, the tax regime does change and may constitute the main reason 
for (re-)incorporation. The legal arbitrage, if exerted, may therefore be an expression of a 
search for the lowest tax rate, not for the best company law293. 
Other arguments which have been brought forward so far can be countered. Some 
scholars294 e.g. point to the fact that in the US, the incorporation theory is applied, which 
means that companies can relatively freely choose the applicable law by simply choosing 
another place for incorporation. Indeed is the legal arbitrage under the incorporation theory 
much higher, because the place of incorporation can be chosen without much relevance to 
other factors. Under the seat theory, on the other hand, choosing a legal order means that 
the company has to move its seat and therefore expose itself to the economic conditions 
that come with it: e.g. infrastructure, workforce etc. A change of incorporation in Europe 
especially has implications on the tax regime, while changes in the US remain irrelevant. The 
arbitrage is therefore not one merely concerning the company law, but is part of the general 
arbitrage which firms can make between different EU member states295. On the other hand, 
it has been argued that the seat is a weak criterion, since in the times of modern 
communication – where e.g. conferences of the management board can be held via 
telephone conference – it can easily be circumvented296. Even in cases of breach of the 
criterion, the enforcement lies according to Art. 64 SE-regulation with the state where the 
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registered office still is. These states, it is argued, have no or little interest in actually 
“chasing” the companies297. 
When discussing the supply side of regulatory competition, the main incentive for states to 
attract companies in the US is the franchise tax. In the US, companies pay this tax 
periodically to the state of their incorporation. Delaware earns 15 – 20 % of its state budget 
by means of this tax298. In Europe, conversely, no such tax exists, as is pointed out299, and 
furthermore, there is no member state in the EU which is so small that it could make a 
comparable share of its state budget with a similar tax300. On the other side, however, one 
can argue that in the US, too, most states do not actively compete any more for “customers” 
of their law: The race is decided (to the favour of Delaware)301. This may make it more 
promising to focus on the demand side, where the absence of the franchise tax does not 
make a difference. 
A similar argument aims at the effects of company law legislation: while Delaware is so small 
and has so many corporations that most of its company laws mainly affect people outside 
Delaware, this is not the same for the EU, where a larger part of the effects would be borne 
by the people of the member state which makes the law302. However, I do not see why 
people in Delaware would be less affected by a deregulated legislation than people in any EU 
member state. 
Concluding one may say that the regulatory competition in Europe will in any case be much 
different from the one in the United States, and less intense. Nevertheless, this does not rule 
out completely the possibility of a European-style competition, maybe taking place rather at 
the incorporation stage then through re-incorporations303  and starting from a bigger 
diversity and reaching different results – not a concentration on one spot like Delaware, but 
maybe rather a co-evolution304. 
b. Legal Literature 
In addition, a look at the literature which focuses on the European legislation without 
comparison to the US reveals an overall slightly more optimistic view on the possibilities for 
regulatory competition in Europe. 
The tendency is more reluctant in the case of horizontal competition, i.e. the competition 
two member states who try to attract an enterprise, or – couched in the terms of the 
demand side – the decision in which member state an SE wants to (re-)establish its seat. In 
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Italian literature, the discussion starts with Rescio who sees legal certainty as a major 
criterion in what he calls “the archipelago game”305. His conclusion is undecided: while 
complexity itself is not already negative, he sees (too much) room for interpretation 
especially if it comes to the “matters… partly regulated”306. Undecided is also the conclusion 
of Sasso who deems it “highly unlikely”307 that the SE will be chosen for subsidiaries, joint 
ventures or EU groups and believes that legal arbitrage will rather be exerted with a view to 
tax law. On the other hand, he considers possibilities of cross-border merger provided by the 
SE interesting308. Even more negative is Fiorio who does not see much room for regulatory 
competition: apart from the real seat requirement, this is in his opinion mainly because the 
SE-regulation leaves freedom especially in areas where the law is harmonised anyway. 
However, he admits that there will be competition in the area of co-determination309. In 
German legal literature, horizontal competition is seen more positively, following Enriques 
who is Italian, but publishes in German and English, too310. He sees the SE as a “catalyst” for 
legal arbitrage, a view which several German scholars share311. Notwithstanding the 
liberalizations in the recent years due to the ECJ judicature, in Europe the transfer of a 
company to another country is still subject to obstacles which can be overcome by the SE312. 
It provides a safe framework for regulatory arbitrage and can thus further horizontal 
competition and arbitrage and helps to overcome path dependencies313. 
Vertical competition, i.e. the concurrence between a member state’s public limited company 
and the same member state’s SE, is generally viewed more positively as a peculiarity of the 
European market with no direct counterpart in the US314. Other than to realise horizontal 
arbitrage, in the case of vertical arbitrage the company has to bridge no language barriers 
which makes a substitution easier and therefore more likely315. The fact that both vertical 
levels are intertwined does not constitute an obstacle316. The role of Article 9 is in this 
context sometimes judged critically by scholars who deem the SE as too thin to constitute an 
actual alternative to the national public limited company317 (which is sometimes blamed on 
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the Council, functioning as a “cartel” of the national legislatures318). However, one has to see 
that some rules do provide more liberty for the company (at least of some countries) – 
especially in the fields of co-determination or the choice between the one-tier and the two-
tier model. If the alternatives of the SE are restricted to some areas only, this means that the 
regulatory arbitrage can be exerted more precisely, as the choice of these alternatives does 
not imply changes to many other fields of law, unlike it is normally the case for horizontal 
arbitrage. Therefore, the lack of regulation in the SE-regulation should be seen as rather 
favouring regulatory arbitrage319. 
Concluding, the possibilities for legal arbitrage in the EU are judged far less skeptically in 
legal literature focusing on the European legislation as opposed to such literature which 
juxtaposes the EU and US situation. 
c. Empirical data 
As opposed to the US, until this day there exist only very scarce data about the existence of 
regulatory arbitrage in Europe. One study, conducted in 2009, dealt with the question 
whether the possibility for legal arbitrage was one of the reasons for companies to 
incorporate as an SE – a hypothesis which could not be verified when referred to the whole 
company law320. There seem to be hints, however, to a forum shopping with regard to co-
determination and to the choice between the one-tier and the two-tier model321. But the 
question answered by the study is not the same as the one this chapter deals with – while 
they asked if the possibility was a reason to incorporate as an SE, here the question is rather 
whether SEs do exert regulatory arbitrage. Hints to this fact can be seen in the cross-border 
transfers of seats which do occur322, sometimes proving “an even bigger mobility of the SE 
than expected”323. Other studies, too, have delivered prove for regulatory arbitrage in the 
area of company law324. Furthermore, there are numerous examples of member states 
reacting to foreign company law or generally trying to make their company law more 
attractive325. This holds true even if there is no such thing as a franchise tax in the EU (cf. 
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above C III 1 a, p. 61), on the one hand because of the influence of lobby groups of legal 
advisors326, on the other as states seem to have certain political ambitions not to have an 
outdated company law327. Thus, one encounters the paradox situation that even if this 
constitutes a reaction to an only assumed or non-existing regulatory arbitrage, there may be 
regulatory competition without or to a higher degree than regulatory arbitrage. 
d. Conclusion 
Thus, as soon as one detaches oneself from the US origins, possibilities for legal arbitrage 
show up. Indisputably they will be less intense than in the US, but at least from a theoretical 
perspective the furthering effects of the SE for regulatory arbitrage are evident, and there is 
– however scarce and scattered it may be – some empirical evidence to support these 
theories. Regulatory arbitrage in Europe may depend on the respective field of company 
law328, and the seat requirement may be an obstacle for horizontal competition. However, 
there is still the possibility of vertical competition, and in cases like cross-border mergers via 
an SE, a decision for one of the two seats is inevitably taken. This may be the case even 
though the real seat requirement is still in place: in the case of international groups, the 
decision where the seat actually is may be of minor importance, given that big enterprises 
will probably have branch offices in several member states and that modern means of 
communication may render the allocation of a seat rather flexible. 
These details shape a picture of a different regulatory competition which takes place in 
Europe: it is far less competitive than that in the US. Maybe only big firms actually do exert 
legal arbitrage because of the high transaction costs and the few questions where such a 
legal arbitrage is possible. The cases where legal arbitrage occurs may be limited to only few 
occasions – e.g. cross-border mergers. Since it is far less possible to exert legal arbitrage than 
in the US, these mergers may not even be triggered by the possibility for legal arbitrage, the 
case may rather be the other way round: legal arbitrage is a question simply posed by such 
mergers329. In Europe, therefore, legal arbitrage may not cause a run to one or few member 
states – other than in the US. Even if the company law of the UK is often deemed more 
attractive than that of, say, France or Germany, or if some minor member states like 
Luxemburg and Ireland are known for attracting companies, a situation like that in the US is 
not to be expected in the near future330. In Europe, legal arbitrage may rather influence the 
cross-border streams of companies which might have occurred anyway. But as usually big 
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players take these decisions, even these few cases may push member states to adjust their 
legislation in small steps – not to strive for a dominance like Delaware, but rather to 
maintain the balance331. Given the higher transaction costs, Europe may be expected to see 
a competition at a slower pace than America, with less extremes and less strident, but still 
existent. 
But while there could be less regulatory competition, there could undoubtedly be much 
more. There are numerous voices in the literature which demand the abolition of obstacles 
which hinder the access to the SE such as the “real seat requirement” (Art. 7 SE-
regulation)332 or the requirement of a transnational element (Art. 2 SE-regulation)333. But 
before these demands can be supported, one has to turn to the question whether more 
regulatory competition is a desirable goal at all. 
2. Is regulatory competition desirable? 
A look at the discussion in the US seems in place, before turning to what can be said about 
the situation in Europe. 
a. Discussion in the US 
In line with the origin of the idea of regulatory competition in the US, there exists since many 
years a vivid discussion about the effects of regulatory competition. Since there are 
considerable differences between the US regulatory competition and its equivalent in 
Europe, for the purposes of this paper it shall suffice to re-draw the major lines of this 
discussion. 
In 1974, Cary complained about the charter competition which, in his eyes, had led to a 
“race for the bottom with Delaware in the lead”334. Here, as the least common denominator, 
fiduciary standards and standards of fairness generally had been relaxed over and over again 
to attract as many companies as possible335 . Regretful about this “deterioration of 
corporation standards”336, he called for higher federal standards337. 
Winter in 1977338 replied to Cary’s essay, arguing that the competition would instead lead to 
the best law (“race to the top”, as it was later called). The powers of the market for 
management control would make the managers strive for a high stock price and therefore 
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maximize the shareholders’ interest, since, otherwise, their jobs would be endangered by 
facilitated takeovers. Any intervention from federal side would disturb the competition for 
the best corporate law. 
There has in the years to follow been a lot of discussion between these two extremes and 
not reached a final conclusion. After Cary and Winter, there have been intermediary 
approaches, too: Romano speaks of the “Genius of American Corporate Law”339, thereby 
denying negative effects of the market powers (in line with Winter). She claims, however, 
that firms are rather attracted not by the content of the Delaware law, but rather by other 
factors, such as the predictability of its law, given the large amount of case law and the 
especially qualified judges340. Other authors accordingly have doomed the competition as a 
“race to nowhere in particular”341. Thus, the domination of Delaware can also be explained 
with network externalities342, i.e. the fact that the large number of firms incorporated in 
Delaware e.g. provide for a high density of case law, which inures to the benefit of the 
company law package. In more recent time, the strict anti-takeover measures that Delaware 
law provides for and which aim rather at the interest of the management than that of the 
shareholders – which may well be interested in a takeover offer, given that it usually 
increases the share price – have made some more critical voices doubt the mere efficiency 
of charter competition343. Concluding, however, one may say that the discussion has left the 
extremes it started from and now mainly takes place on the “middle ground”344. 
b. Conclusion for Europe 
However, the transferability of these views to the European market remains questionable. 
This holds e.g. true for the critique on the strong anti-takeover measures which are in place 
in Delaware: on the one hand, as mentioned above in C III 1 a, p. 61 ff., ownership in (most 
of) the EU member states is far less dispersed than in the US, which means that the 
managers would be less powerful in relation to the shareholders than their American 
colleagues. On a normative level, the situation is different, too: “good corporate law” in 
Europe does not only consider the shareholders’ interests, but is generally recognized as 
such which strikes a just balance between the interests of diverse groups, including, other 
than shareholders, also creditors and the employed. But also the focus on Delaware’s 
dominance is not in place in the European discussion where there is no such dominating 
member state. Given the high transaction costs, a similar development is not to be expected, 
either. This contains the dangers of a “race to the bottom”345, while positive effects – like 
that of states reacting to other states’ legislature – may be scarce, but can be seen. In this 
way, the company law of the European member states may profit from the experiences of 
other states and show signs of a bottom-up harmonisation at least in some questions, while 
outgrowths may be fought by the legislator (on the federal or national level) since a panic 
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run to single member states is most unlikely. Similarly, the dangers of a misallocation of 
resources 346  do not seem to provide an argument against the present regulatory 
competition: at the worst, resources may remain inefficiently allocated where they are – so 
the allocation will not improve. That it actually worsens seems highly unlikely, given that 
company law is only one (minor) factor of many and that transaction costs remain high. This 
may be the reason why the (slightly stimulating) effect that Article 9 has on the competition 
is, in my view convincingly, almost unanimously seen as positive347. 
IV. Prospect of an extension to a comprehensive optional instrument 
In this section, the extension to a comprehensive instrument shall be discussed, i.e. a (more) 
complete SE-regulation which, as opposed to the current state, could do without any or with 
only very few referrals to national law. This would be an alternative version of the SE-
regulation that could do without Article 9 or at least would have to use a similar clause of 
referral only in a very limited ambit. Although in this chapter some arguments from the 
discussion of the full harmonisation will be used, both concepts have to be distinguished: the 
comprehensive instrument – an SE without references to national law – will not constitute 
an example of full harmonisation as it will still be optional. Full harmonisation would mean 
that there is only one model of public limited liability company in Europe, the optional 
instrument means that in addition to the (28) member state models, there is another 29th 
model, independent and self-contained. 
To discuss this prospect, after an evaluation of the status quo (1) and the probabilities of 
change (2), I will discuss the desirability of such a step (4), where it may be of help to have a 
look at comparable projects in the general area of European private law (3). 
1. Evaluation of the status quo: are more rules desirable? 
While the evaluation of the status quo is subject of the whole second part of this paper, this 
section will deal with the question if “more” rules would be good. The questions if a 
comprehensive (complete) regulation is desirable is saved for a later section (C IV 4, p. 73), 
as is the final decision on whether the current regulation is preferable to no regulation at all 
(D). 
Looking at the current state of the SE-regulation, most scholars utter regretful opinions on 
the lack of rules provided for348. This holds true especially for the lack of rules regarding the 
organisational structure349, but also for the tax regime, since especially “many cross-border 
corporate structures are dictated by tax considerations more than any other factor”350. As 
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the most detrimental consequences of the lack of regulation, the lack of clarity and the loss 
of workability (cf. above C I and II, p. 58 ff.) are mentioned; the latter often with reference to 
the self-proclaimed goals of the legislator as evident from the Recitals351. 
A number of advantages are seen in the current regulation instead (not because) of its lack 
of regulation. Even with the few rules it has, the SE is held to constitute a common ideal for 
Europe and to thus influence the legislation in the member states352. Others see it rather as 
a common reference point – similar to what the Structure Directive failed to become – 
without the ambition to constitute an “ideal model”353, but nonetheless with a positive 
function in the harmonisation process in European private law. 
Some scholars even find positive aspects in the absence of rules itself. Insofar as they 
mention the possibility to further regulatory competition354, I refer to the last section D I, p. 
75 ff., where I will deal with this idea in more detail. Another reason which was already 
mentioned above (C II, p. 58) are the “positive network externalities”. While this may be true 
for an “easing-in period”, one has to see that with time, such effects would vanish355. A full 
regulation might have a more difficult start, but with emerging case law and more practical 
experience also among legal counsels, acceptance for the genuinely European rules would 
grow. The current form of positive network externalities does therefore in my opinion not 
constitute an advantage in comparison to a comprehensive instrument. 
Concluding one has to state that the disadvantages of the absence of rules are still high. The 
main view is that the benefits, which often remain vague, do not outweigh the 
disadvantages, mainly in terms of high transaction costs, which come with such a 
structure 356 . Even to profit from possible advantages like an enhanced regulatory 
competition, a higher density of rules appears desirable. This is because even to fulfil 
functions like that of opening competition, a certain amount of rules is necessary357. With 
more rules on the European level, regulatory arbitrage could even be more specific, as the 
national law for the few remaining gaps could be more purposefully picked (without too 
many implications in other fields of law). More rules appear even desirable if the rules on 
the European level may not in all cases be as convincing as they could be358 and are so 
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especially in the sector of organisation, where the lack of regulation is hardly justifiable359. 
But while “more” rules appear desirable, it remains for a later chapter to discuss whether 
“all” rules should be given on the European level (C IV 4, p. 73). 
2. Probability of a comprehensive instrument 
Art. 69 SE-regulation promises the re-assessment of the regulation after 5 years and poses 
the question of how flexible norms on a European level actually are. As of now, the 5 years 
have lapsed and, as is commonly known, the Commission intends no amendments to the SE-
regulation in the short term360. This and the fact that the legislative process in the EU can 
take a long time – as impressively illustrated by the example of the SE itself, cf. above A I, p. 
13 – have led to concerns that the absence of rules may hem the harmonisation process361 – 
the current status would then be a “dead end”. Other voices remain more optimistic and 
point to the fact that the introduction of the SE speeds up the rhythm of reforms in the area 
of European company law362. 
Even if political processes are impossible to predict, a few factors may favour later 
amendments to the regulation. There is on the one hand the fact that now that the new 
legal forms is applicable, it has become a focal point of critical review in legal literature363. 
Where critique is uttered in a unanimous manner like in some cases – e.g. the “real seat 
requirement” or the requirement of a cross-border element, cf. above C III 1 d, p. 66 ff. – it is 
more likely to be taken into account by the European legislator. On the other hand, its 
growing acceptance in the legal practice may sharpen the demand for certain rules, and case 
law of the ECJ may help pave the way for future amendments, too. I therefore do not share 
the sceptical view of Fleischer and remain slightly optimistic that we may actually see 
amendments to the SE-regulation in the medium term. 
A comprehensive instrument, however, does not appear to be in sight. In politically delicate 
areas like co-determination, it seems highly unlikely that the differences between member 
states will be overcome, and be it only for the purpose of an additional optional instrument. 
While further steps towards a more comprehensive SE-regulation remain likely, there are 
still too many gaps in the regulation to hope for a comprehensive instrument any time soon. 
It appears even likely that there may be a general political reluctance to allow a general 
competition. 
3. Excursus: Comparison to PECL / CESL / CISG 
This political reluctance may be a reason why similar projects have never had the impact in 
the practice that they could have had. One has to turn one’s eye to other areas of civil law to 
find similar projects, especially in the area of contract law. 
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As opposed to the PECL, the SE-regulation is legally binding. The closest comparable norms 
are the UN Sales Law (CISG) and the proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL)364. 
A connecting factor between the three regulations can be seen in the fact that in each case, 
access is not as easily granted as would be theoretically easily possible and as literature 
often demands. As for the SE-regulation, the main obstacles to the access are namely the 
real seat requirement and the requirement of a cross-border element. Similarly, the CESL is 
only applicable for cross-border contracts (Art. 4 para. 1 CESL-Regulation) and only in specific 
B2B and B2C-relations (cf. Art. 7 CESL-Regulation). The CISG, too, requires cross-border sales 
(Art. 1 CISG)365 and excludes B2C-contracts for most cases (Art. 2 lit. a CISG). 
All these obstacles have in common that they reduce the choice of those concerned by the 
law. For the scope of this paper, an in-depth analysis of the reasons of such obstacles is not 
possible. I will therefore restrain myself to the hypothesis that there is a general political 
reluctance to pass on important areas of their civil law to a supranational legislator, and be it 
only for the sake of an optional instrument. Such reluctance may be motivated by fears that 
a similar development like in Canada366 or in the US – with Delaware taking the place of a 
federal legislator – may happen367. 
As opposed to the SE, however, both instruments – CISG and CESL – are comprehensive 
regulations of its respective ambit. 
This means that they rely on national law not at all or to a far lesser degree only. According 
to Art. 4 para. 1 CESL, the “Common European Sales Law is to be interpreted autonomously 
and in accordance with its objectives and the principles underlying it”, any recourse to 
national law is explicitly excluded in Art. 4 para. 2 CESL. The CISG has recourse to national 
law, since cases not settled by the rules “are to be settled in conformity with the general 
principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the 
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law” (Art. 7 para. 2 CISG). 
However, these cases are far fewer than in the case of the SE-regulation, since with a 
hundred articles, the CISG reaches a similar density of regulation like national civil codes. 
The question of the use of principles in the SE-regulation has been discussed already (cf. 
above B III 2, p. 44). Here it suffice to note that the commentators who compare the SE-
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regulation reach from regretful to delighted when looking at the SE-regulation, depending 
on their point of view368. 
This character as comprehensive regulations enables them to constitute a “model” for 
further legislation. Thus, even if the CISG was usually excluded in the first years in German 
legal practice, the German legislator shaped the 2002 reform of the German Civil Code 
(Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) in some aspects after the CISG. Even if the SE, 
notwithstanding its young age, has already started inspiring national legislators – cf. only the 
Italian company law reform369 – its lack of substantive regulations makes it less interesting as 
such a model, since most questions are left for the national legislators to deal with anyway. 
Thus, the SE-regulation will not have the same influence as a “model” regulation like the 
CISG370.  
Concluding one has to state that, while a higher density of regulation in the SE-regulation 
would certainly also improve its function as a “model” for further legislation, a side-looking 
glance at similar projects reveals that the introduction of complete optional instruments is 
politically apparently hard to realise. Reason for the described reluctance may be concerns 
that Europe as a community of values may not yet be ripe for such a step371. 
4. Preliminary evaluation: desirability of a comprehensive optional instrument 
Even though a comprehensive optional instrument may not be seen any time soon, I will 
shortly dwell on the question whether it would be desirable at all. The question is not 
whether there should not be more rules in the regulation (cf. to this question above C IV 1, p. 
69) or whether the regulation should have been passed in the present form at all (cf. to this 
question below D, p. 75 ff.), but whether it would be a good thing to have all questions of 
company law answered on the European level. 
Some arguments from the discussion about full harmonisation can be used in this chapter, 
too. It is to be noted that a comprehensive instrument has to be consistent with the member 
states’ national legal orders. While it may not – if it is supposed to be an instrument 
completely of the federal level – be orientated along the lines of national law, it must pay 
respect to the structure, functioning and established rules of national law. Gsell and 
Herresthal point to this fact when speaking about private law in general372, but it holds even 
more true when applied to a company like the SE which is interconnected with many areas 
of law, such as the law of groups, capital market law, antitrust and competition law, labour 
law, contract law, criminal law, banking and insurance supervision and many others. While at 
its current state, the many referrals to national law, foremost Article 9, ease the transitions 
with national law, it would be a far greater challenge to create a comprehensive instrument 
for such a central area of private law. On the other hand, it has to be taken into account that 
                                                     
368 Ibid., 58; Fleischer, “Der Einfluß der Societas Europaea auf die Dogmatik des deutschen Gesellschaftsrechts,” 
508 f. 
369 Striking a balance 10 years into the reform Montalenti, “La società per azioni a dieci anni dalla riforma: un 
primo bilancio” with more details on the impact of the SE-regulation under 11. (p. 419 ff.). 
370 Bachmann, “Hommelhoff-FS,” 33. 
371 Such concerns expressed in ibid., 43. 





many of the mentioned areas are now already harmonised to a higher degree than company 
law, which would ease the transition in numerous cases. 
Another economic factor to take into account are the costs of implementing a 
comprehensive instrument. They have to be set off against the gains in efficiency due to e.g. 
lower costs of identifying the applicable law373. While this is true, in the case of the SE it is to 
be expected that the balance would soon turn positive374. 
I cannot detect a clear tendency in the discussion as far as it was depicted so far. Indeed, the 
clincher usually is the argumentation with regulatory competition. As soon as full 
harmonisation poses an alternative to regulatory competition, many scholars plead for the 
latter375. However, in the case of optional instruments (and perforated regulations) like in 
the case of the SE, the discussion is not so easy. I will leave it for the next chapter to 
distinguish between vertical and horizontal competition, decide the argument and draw a 
final conclusion also between this and the last chapter.  
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D. Summary and Final Conclusions 
In this last section, I will try to sum up the results and to draw final conclusions. To this end, I 
will first draw a synthesis between the last two subsections (C III and IV, p. 60 ff.) by asking 
what a comprehensive instrument would mean for regulatory competition (75I). Afterwards 
I will try to answer the core question if the Nice compromise should not better not have 
been passed (II). A summary will be given in the last section (III). 
I. Consequences of a comprehensive instrument for regulatory competition 
While we have seen in a previous chapter (C III 2, p. 67 ff.) that regulatory competition 
cannot be seen as overall good or bad, one has also to distinguish the implications of a 
comprehensive regulation for regulatory competition. The at first glance surprising result of 
a glance at legal literature reveals that some scholars are against more rules because they 
would hem more regulatory competition376 – others are in favour of such rules, with the 
argument that they would fuel such competition377. The result is not surprising any more if 
one looks at the already introduced (above C III, p. 60 ff.) distinction between vertical and 
horizontal competition: while a comprehensive instrument would constitute a full-fledged 
alternative on the federal level, there would be much more possibility for vertical arbitrage 
as many more rules would change. (Cf. above C III 1 b, p. 63 ff. to the lack of federal rules as 
an obstacle to vertical competition.) Horizontal competition, on the other hand, is now 
facilitated only by the gaps in the SE-regulation – with their disappearance, there would not 
be any more horizontal competition by means of the SE. 
Since there is no clear preference between vertical or horizontal competition – none is 
better than the other one, they are just different – the question is undecided at this level. 
Given, however, that the introduction of a comprehensive instrument appears not yet in 
sight (cf. above C IV 2, p. 71 ff.), but that on the other hand more provisions are to be 
expected, the question is whether this “more” could not constitute a compromise between 
both positions. The easier part of the answer is that a “more” of provisions would also mean 
“more” vertical competition. Even few more options offered by the European legislator 
could “improve” the situation378 – i.e. create more of the European competition which may 
well be regarded as positive (cf. above). 
As far as the horizontal competition is concerned, I believe that more rules would to a 
certain degree favour competition, too. This is because with more rules on the European 
level, in the case of a transfer of seat, more rules would remain the same. This would make 
transfers more easy, since for more questions of law, the choice would not have any 
implications. For the remaining questions – i.e. the gaps which would still remain even in an 
enhanced regulation – the choice could be exerted in a more purposeful manner. While now 
the decision between a seat in France and Germany equals more or less the decision: French 
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or German corporate law?, in a near future, that decision could e.g. come down to the 
question: French or German capital requirements and rights of shareholders in the general 
assembly? For these specific areas, the competition could then be much more effective. 
While undecided for the option of a comprehensive optional instrument, I believe therefore 
that more provisions would create more desirable competition. 
II. The Nice compromise: Stepping stone or dead end? 
In a previous section, I have answered the forward-looking question whether there will be 
further amendments to the SE-regulation in a slightly affirmative manner (cf. above C IV 2, p. 
71 ff.) – the Nice compromise does not constitute a “dead end”, even if a comprehensive 
instrument is not to be expected any time soon. In this section, I will try to answer the 
retrospective question if the Nice compromise – including Article 9 as it is – was a good 
development or if it hindered (potential) legislation in the area. 
Given the difficulties to assess political processes, there cannot be a decisive answer to this 
question. Several arguments, though, suggest that the Nice compromise did not block a 
potential agreement on a comprehensive regulation. The difficulties of the political process 
cast doubt on any hope that in the meanwhile, any such agreement could have been 
reached. To the opposite, I believe that we now are not only one step further than we would 
have been without the Nice compromise. Given that now the SE is in place, acceptance in 
legal practice (led by some of Europe’s biggest enterprises), attention in legal literature and 
treatment in emerging case law will grow (cf. to these points already above C IV 2, p. 71). 
Furthermore, where there remain differences between the SEs from different member 
states, the company laws enter into a (reduced) form of regulatory competition (cf. above C 
III 1 d, p. 66 f.) which will exert pressure on those member states with the most incongruous 
company law features. Even if the regulatory competition will not lead to a “race” to 
anywhere – like Delaware in the US – it can improve the political will of member states of 
the EU to strike compromises when re-negotiating the SE-regulation. In a next step, the 
expected rise in regulatory density (cf. above C IV 2, p. 71 ff.) could then in fact be reached. 
There are sometimes concerns that any provision on a European level could lead to a 
“fossilisation”379. However, even in member states the process can be blocked in a similar 
manner (and even worse) – there are even cases when member states have recourse to the 
European level to overcome hold-ups on the national level380. The “fossilisation”-argument 
therefore does in my opinion not speak against provisions on a European level. 
Thus, the Nice compromise, including Article 9 as it is, would prove to have been a stepping 
stone. This regulatory technique of first offering a non-complete regulation may therefore 
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indeed constitute an interesting political option for later difficult legislation processes, 
concerning e.g. contract law or smaller companies381. 
III. Towards a balance between regulation and competition in Europe 
When summing up the results of the previous chapters, I cannot but conclude optimistically. 
Assessing the impact of Article 9 SE-regulation, I find that the provision is complicated, but 
understandable. Even though more clarification would be warmly welcomed in some 
questions which literature has discussed so far, the legal transposition seems to not 
unnecessarily further complicate the already complicated political decision. Various practical 
examples prove its workability. 
If the compromise which had to been struck between regulation and non-regulation has 
sometimes been decried as “uniting all possible disadvantages”382, I optimistically counter: 
given the circumstances, in Nice a result at least not far from the optimal solution was 
passed. The fact that the SE was finally made possible gave rise to review in literature as well 
as respectable practical success, which, for its part, will inure to the benefit of the image of 
the SE as well as give rise to case law. The still existing gaps in the regulation further a 
genuinely European form of competition – less aggressive than in the US, with less danger of 
a “race to the bottom” or to some single member state, and with slower, but in the long 
term positive developments to be expected. While more provisions would certainly be 
helpful for this competition – of whatever kind – I believe that these provisions will be 
introduced in the mid term, in any case more likely with the Nice compromise than we 
would have had it without. Thus, the Nice compromise will prove not to be an obstacle to 
further development, but a stepping stone towards a balance between competition and 
regulation in Europe. 
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a) nach den 
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b) falls diese 
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Grundsätze keine 
Lösung bieten, nach 
den gemeinsamen 
Regeln oder den 
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n/a Article I-7 
 
1. L’application et 
l’interpretation de 
ce Statut doivent 
respecter son but 
qui est la formation, 
par tous les Etats 
contractants, pour 
ce droit uniforme, 
d’un territoire 
unique. 
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concernant des 
matières régies par 
le présent Statut et 
qui ne sont pas 
expressément 
tranchées par celui-
ci seront réglées : 
a) selon les 
principes généraux 
dont ce Statut 
s’inspire ; 
b) dans le cas où ces 
principes généraux 
n’offrent pas de 
solution, selon les 
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les ordres juridiques 
des Etats 
contractants. 
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a) selon les 
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Article 7 
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contraire, les 
matières que le 
présent statut régit, 
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2. Besteht ein Staat 
aus mehreren 
Gebietseinheiten, 
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Bereichen besitzt, 
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und des Rechts der 
Mitgliedstaaten auf 
die SE Anwendung. 





(Scope of the 
Regulation) 
1. Matters covered 
by this Regulation, 
but not expressly 
mentioned 
herein, shall be 
governed: 
(a) by the general 
principles upon 
which this 
Regulation is based; 
(b) if those general 
principles do not 
provide a solution 
to the problem, 
by the law applying 
to public limited 
companies In the 
State in which 
the SE has its 
registered office. 
2. Where a State 
comprises several 
territorial units, 
each of which has 
its own rules of law 
applicable to the 
matters referred to 
in paragraph 1, 
each territorial unit 
shall be considered 
a State for the 
purposes of 
identifying the law 
applicable under 
paragraph 1(b) . 
3. In matters which 
are not covered by 
this Regulation, 
Community law and 
the law of the 
Member States 
shall apply to the 
SE. 
4. In each Member 
State and subject to 
the express 
provisions of this 
Regulation, an SE 
shall have the same 
rights, powers and 






1. Dans Les 
matières que le 
présent règlement 




réglés doivent être 
tranchés : 
a) selon les 
principes généraux 
dont ce règlement 
s'inspire, 
b) si ces principes 
généraux ne 
permettent pas de 
trancher la 
question, selon la 
loi applicable aux 
sociétés anonymes 
dans l'Etat 
du siège de la SE. 




a ses propres règles 
applicables aux 
matières visées au 
paragraphe 1, 
chaque unité 
territorial e est 
considérée comme 
un Etat aux fin s de 
la 
détermination de la 
loi applicable selon 
le paragraphe sous 
b). 
3. Dans les matières 
qui ne sont pas 
régies par le présent 
règlement, Les 
dispositions du droit 
communautaire et 
du droit des Etats 
membres sont 
applicables à la SE. 
4 . En ce qui 
concerne ses 
droits , facultés et 
obligations , La SE 
est 
Articolo 7 (Campo 
d’applicazione) 
1. Nelle materie 
disciplinate dal 
presente 
regolamento i punti 
non espressamente 
regolati sono risolti: 
a) secondo i principi 
generali cui si 
informa il presente 
regolamento; 
b) qualora tali 
principi generali 
non permettano di 
risolvere la 
questione, secondo 
la legge applicabile 
alle società per 
azioni nello Stato 
della sede della SE. 
2. Se uno Stato 
comprende più 
unità territoriali 
ciascuna delle quali 
ha le proprie norme 
applicabili alle 
materie previste dal 
paragrafo 1, ogni 
unità territoriale è 
considerata come 





il paragrafo 1, 
lettera b). 




applicano alla SE 
disposizioni del 
diritto comunitario 
e del diritto degli 
Stati membri. 
4. Per quanto 
riguarda i diritti, le 
facoltà e gli obblighi 
che ad essa 
competono, la SE è 
trattata, in ciascuno 
Stato membro e 





1. En las materias a 








a) con arreglo a los 
principios generales 




b) si estos principios 
generales no 
permiten resolver el 
asunto, con arreglo 
a la ley aplicable a 
las sociedades 
andnimas en el 
Estado del domicilio 
de 
la SE. 




una con sus 
propias reglas para 
las materias 
contempladas en el 




un Estado a efectos 
de la determinación 
de la 
ley aplicable a tenor 
de la letra b) del 
apartado 1. 
3. En las materias 
no reguladas por el 
presente 
Reglamento, se 
aplicarán a la 
SE. las disposiciones 
del Derecho 
comunitario y del 


















traitée , dans 
chaque Etat 





comme une société 





una società per 
azioni di diritto 
interno.  
miembros. 
4. Por lo que 




considerará a la SE, 
en cada Estado 
miembro y sin 









1991 (COM(91) 174 
final) 
Artikel 7 
(1) SE unterliegen: 
a) — den 
Bestimmungen 
dieser Verordnung; 
— sofern diese 
Verordnung dies 
ausdrücklich zuläßt 
den von den 
Parteien in der 




— dem im Sitzstaat 
der SE für 
Aktiengesellschafte
n geltenden Recht; 
— den von den 




unter den gleichen 
Voraussetzungen 
wie im Fall von 
Aktiengesellschafte
n, für die das Recht 
des Sitzstaates der 
SE gilt. 
2. Besteht ein Staat 
aus mehreren 
Gebietseinheiten, 
von denen jede ihre 
eigene Regelung für 
die in Absatz 1 
genannten 
Bereichen besitzt, 
so wird zum Zwecke 
der Ermittlung des 














SEs shall be 
governed: 
(a) - by the 
provisions of this 
regulation; 
- where expressly 
authorized by this 
regulation, by the 
provisions freely 
determined by the 
parties in the 
stautes of the SE; 
(b) failing this: 
- by the provisions 
of the law on public 
limited companies 
of the Member 
state in which the 
SE has its registered 
office; 
- by the provisions 
freely determined 
by the parties in the 
statutes, in 
accordance with the 
same conditions as 
for public limited 
companies 
governed by the law 
of the Member 
State in which the 
SE has its registered 
office. 
2. Where a State 
comprises several 
territorial units, 
each of which has 
its own rules of law 
applicable to the 
matters referred to 
in paragraph 1, each 
territorial unit shall 
be considered a 
State for the 
purposes of 
identifying the law 
applicable under 
paragraph 1(b) . 
3. In each Member 
State and subject to 
Article 7 
 
Les SE sont régles 
par: 
a) – les dispositions 
du présent 
règlement 






déterminées par les 
parties dans les 
statuts de la SE, 
b, à défaut, par : 
- Les dispositions de 
la loi de L’Etat du 
siège de la SE 
relatives aux 
sociétés anonymes ; 
- les dispositions 
librement 
déterminées par les 
parties dans les 
statuts, dans les 
mêmes conditions 
que pour les 
sociétés anonymes 
relevant du droit de 
l’Etat du siège de la 
SE. 




a ses propres règles 
applicables aux 
matières visées au 
paragraphe 1, 
chaque unité 
territorial e est 
considérée comme 
un Etat aux fin s de 
la 
détermination de la 
loi applicable selon 
le paragraphe sous 
b). 




1. La SE è 
disciplinata: 











stabilite delle parti 
nello statuto della 
SE; 
b, in difetto: 
- dalle disposizioni 
di legge dello stato 
della sede della SE 
riguardanti le 
società per azioni; 
- dalle disposizioni 
liberamente 
stabilite dalle parti 
nello statuto, alle 
stesse condizioini 
previste per le 
società per azioni 
soggette alla 
legislazione dello 
Stato della sede 
della SE. 
2. Se uno Stato 
comprende più 
unità territoriali 
ciascuna delle quali 
ha le proprie norme 
applicabili alle 
materie previste dal 
paragrafo 1, ogni 
unità territoriale è 
considerata come 





il paragrafo 1, 
lettera b). 














provisions of this 
Regulation, an SE 
shall have the same 
rights, powers and 





droits , facultés et 
obligations , La SE 
est 
traitée , dans 
chaque Etat 





comme une société 
anonyme du droit 
national. 
3. Per quanto 
riguarda i diritti, le 
facoltà e gli obblighi 
che ad essa 
competono, la SE è 
trattata, in ciascuno 
Stato membro e 





una società per 




(EC) No 2157/2001 
of 8 October 2001 
















der Satzung der SE, 
 
c) in Bezug auf die 
nicht durch diese 
Verordnung 
geregelten Bereiche 
oder, sofern ein 
Bereich nur 
teilweise geregelt 
ist, in Bezug auf die 

















die auf eine nach 
dem Recht des 








Satzung unter den 
gleichen 
Voraussetzungen 
wie im Falle einer 
nach dem Recht des 
Article 9 
 
1. An SE shall be 
governed: 
 
(a) by this 
Regulation, 
 
(b) where expressly 
authorised by this 
Regulation, by the 





(c) in the case of 
matters not 
regulated by this 
Regulation or, 
where matters are 
partly regulated by 
it, of those aspects 
not covered by it, 
by: 
 
(i) the provisions of 
laws adopted by 




specifically to SEs; 
 
(ii) the provisions of 
Member States' 
laws which would 
apply to a public 
limited-liability 
company formed in 
accordance with the 
law of the Member 
State in which the 
SE has its registered 
office; 
 
(iii) the provisions of 
its statutes, in the 




accordance with the 
law of the Member 
State in which the 
Article 9 
 
1. La SE est régie: 
 








les dispositions des 




c) pour les matières 





les aspects non 




i) les dispositions de 
loi adoptées par les 








ii) les dispositions 





selon le droit de 
l'État membre dans 
lequel la SE a son 
siège statutaire; 
 
iii) les dispositions 
des statuts de la SE, 
dans les mêmes 





1. La SE è 
disciplinata: 
 














c) per le materie 
non disciplinate dal 
presente 
regolamento o, 
qualora una materia 
lo sia parzialmente, 
per gli aspetti ai 




i) dalle disposizioni 
di legge adottate 
dagli Stati membri 






ii) dalle disposizioni 
di legge degli Stati 
membri che si 
applicherebbero ad 
una società per 
azioni costituita in 
conformità della 
legge dello Stato 
membro in cui la SE 
ha la sede sociale; 
 
iii) dalle disposizioni 
dello statuto della 
SE, alle stesse 
condizioni previste 
per una società per 
Artículo 9 
 
1. Las SE se regirán: 
 
a) por lo dispuesto 
en el presente 
Reglamento; 
 





las disposiciones de 





c) respecto de las 
materias no 
reguladas por el 
presente 
Reglamento o, si se 
trata de materias 
reguladas sólo en 
parte, respecto de 
los aspectos no 




i) por las 
disposiciones 










ii) por las 
disposiciones 
legales de los 
Estados miembros 
que fuesen de 
aplicación a una 
sociedad anónima 
constituida con 
arreglo a la 
legislación del 









(2) Von den 
Mitgliedstaaten 
eigens für die SE 
erlassene 
Rechtsvorschriften 
müssen mit den für 
Aktiengesellschafte






(3) Gelten für die 






Rechts, so finden 
diese Vorschriften 
auf die SE 
uneingeschränkt 
Anwendung. 
SE has its registered 
office. 
 
2. The provisions of 
laws adopted by 
Member States 
specifically for the 
SE must be in 
accordance with 
Directives 
applicable to public 
limited-liability 
companies referred 
to in Annex I. 
 
3. If the nature of 
the business carried 
out by an SE is 
regulated by 
specific provisions 
of national laws, 
those laws shall 
apply in full to the 
SE. 
selon le droit de 
l'État membre dans 
lequel la SE a son 
siège statutaire. 
 
2. Les dispositions 
de loi adoptées par 
les États membres 
spécifiquement 
pour la SE doivent 




figurant à l'annexe I. 
 
3. Si la nature des 
activités exercées 
par une SE est régie 
par des dispositions 








legge dello Stato 
membro in cui la SE 
ha la sede sociale. 
 
2. Le disposizioni di 
legge adottate dagli 
Stati membri 
specificamente per 
la SE devono essere 
conformi alle 
direttive applicabili 




3. Se la natura delle 
attività svolte da 




queste ultime sono 
integralmente 
applicate alla SE. 
el que la SE tenga su 
domicilio social; 
 
iii) por las 
disposiciones de los 
estatutos, en las 
mismas condiciones 




arreglo a la 
legislación del 
Estado miembro en 
el que la SE tenga su 
domicilio social. 
 
2. Las disposiciones 




para las SE deberán 
ser conformes con 
las Directivas 
aplicables a las 
sociedades 
anónimas a que se 
refiere el anexo I. 
 
3. Si el carácter de 
la actividad que 
desarrolle una SE 
estuviere regulado 
por disposiciones 




aplicables a la SE. 
 
 
